SALMON-FISHERY OF SCOTLAND. . 89 



rivers ? Can there be a more direct contradiction than the 

 words fry of sea fishes, or of all fishes, which are never 

 found in rivers or fresh waters, and which could not live there 

 a day, to the assertion of the Court, that the word " waters " 

 was intended to be restricted to rivers or fresh waters, and 

 that it was not used in its general sense, as applying to waters 

 of every description, where the fry of sea fishes, or of all fishes, 

 or of any kind or description of fish, are to be found and could 

 be destroyed ? We do not think that it was possible to ex- 

 press the prohibition in terms more general or comprehensive. 

 Yairs could only be placed where the tide ebbs and flows ; and 

 the statutes therefore prohibit them in "all waters within 

 reach of the tide;" that is, in all parts where they could be 

 placed, or where fry of any kind, whether of sea or river fishes, 

 could be destroyed. But the Court of Session says this only 

 means rivers, where yairs could not be erected, and where the 

 fry of sea fishes are not to be found. The statutes describe 

 these yairs as actually destroying the fry of all fishes ; and the 

 Court of Session tells us this must mean rivers, which the fry 

 of all fishes never enter ! Some of the statutes expressly 

 mention the prohibition to be in salt water that ebbs and flows, 

 where the fry of all fishes are truly and actually destroyed by 

 yairs, as the statutes state ; the fry of sea fishes swimming 

 about the shores, and the fry of salmon in their descent from 

 the rivers : but the Court of Session says that salt water 

 means fresh water, because it is in fresh water only the fry of 

 sea fishes can be destroyed ; and this perfect nonsense it assures 

 the country is LAW the law of the statutes and dispose of 

 the most valuable vested rights of individuals, as we said, ac- 

 cordingly. If Lord Lyndhurst, from want of proper explana- 

 tion, or of due consideration, acceded to the opinion of the 

 Court in the Kintore Case,* that assuredly (however this in- 

 dividual case may have been disposed of by it) does not con- 

 stitute it LAW, contrary to the plain meaning of the statutes 

 since nothing, as we said before, can legally do so save an Act 

 of Parliament. 



* This is the first case we have ever seen decided in the Court of Appeal on 

 grounds of absolute nonsense. 



