CHAP. X.] THE SCOPE OF MIND. 139 



of and by itself. A similar popular fallacy attaches to 

 the common acceptation of the word ' Life.' To many 

 this also is the name of an entity, though, in reality, it 

 is only a more general abstraction, including under it the 

 one with which we are now concerned. 



The term ' Mind,' indeed, no more corresponds to a 

 definite self-existing principle than the word 'Magnetism/ 

 This conclusion, if not a direct revelation of Conscious- 

 ness, is one of those " legitimate inferences " to which 

 John Stuart Mill alludes, in the following passage, as 

 constituting so large a part of human knowledge. 



He says*: " All theories of the human Mind profess to 

 be interpretations of Consciousness. The conclusions of 

 all of them are supposed to rest on that ultimate evidence 

 either immediately, or remotely. What Consciousness 

 directly reveals, together with what can be legitimately 

 inferred from its revelations, compose by universal admis- 

 sion all that we Unoiv of the Mind or, indeed, of any 

 other thing.'" 



The various conscious or subjective states known to 

 each one of us are often classified under three principal 

 categories, corresponding to what are commonly spoken 

 of as (1) Sensation and Emotion ; (2) Intellect, and 

 (3) Will or Volition. 



All that we know of Mind is derived (a), directly or 

 by inference, from our own subjective states (Subjective 

 Psychology), supplemented by (b), what we are able to 

 infer from the words or other actions of our fellow-men 

 and lower animals, as to the possession by them of 

 similar states (Objective Psychology), and (c) by what 

 we are able to learn as to the dependence of these 

 subjective states upon the activity of certain parts of 

 our bodies and of the bodies of other animals (Neurology, 

 * " Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy," p. 107. 



