CHAP. X.] THE SCOPE OF MIND. 143 



One of the principal errors, which the metaphysical 

 conception of Mind as an entity entails, is that ' mental 

 phenomena ' are supposed to be limited or hounded by the 

 sphere of Consciousness. That this has been the view of 

 the great majority of philosophers any student of their 

 writings will easily discover. Thus Consciousness is said 

 by one of them, to be " the fundamental condition of all 

 intelligence," whilst another holds that, "of all the 

 present operations of the mind, consciousness is an 

 inseparable concomitant." Such doctrines are, indeed, 

 legitimate deductions from the metaphysical view concern- 

 ing Mind, though its inadequacy is now fully recognized 

 not only by physiologists, but also by some modern 

 psychologists. Thus Professor Bain, after speaking 

 of Mind in its three fundamental capacities, Feeling, 

 Action (Volition), and Thought, says*: " Consciousness 

 is inseparable from the first of these capacities, but 

 not as it appears to me, from the second or the third. 

 True, our actions and thoughts are usually conscious, that 

 is, are known to us by an inward perception ; but the 

 consciousness of an act is manifestly not the act, and, 

 although the assertion is less obvious, I believe that the 

 consciousness of a thought is distinct from the thought." 



The sphere of ' mental phenomena ' cannot, indeed, be 

 circumscribed by the sphere of Consciousness, and the 

 recognition of this fact necessitates the absolute rejection 

 of the word ' Mind ' in its old signification, and compels 

 us to include under this collective abstract term multitudes 

 of processes or nerve actions, which now, so far as we are 

 aware, have no correlative subjective aspects, though they 



* " The Senses ana the Intellect," p. 1. The language of the 

 three statements there given by way of definition of Mind, seems 

 to imply a belief in a self-existent something, able to Feel and 

 Think, and capable of Acting. 



