148 THE SCOPE OF MIND. 



use tends to introduce confusion into a subject the natural 

 complexity of which already makes it sufficiently baffling. 

 There may be nascent, ill- defined, or abortive subjective 

 sides to many nerve actions, but, if these do not answer 

 in ourselves to what we know as Consciousness, it should 

 not be said, that ' sensibility ' is an appanage of such 

 nerve actions. 



If, however, we are compelled to believe that Conscious- 

 ness is not co-extensive with the sphere of ' Mind,' in 

 the ordinary acceptation of these terms, and that no 

 expedient modification of the meaning of the word 

 Consciousness could make it so, then in face of the now 

 admitted fact concerning the frequent interpolation of what 

 J. S. Mill called mere "organic states of the nerves,'* 

 or unconscious nerve actions, as integral parts of mental 

 processes only one other course lies open to us. We 

 must widen the signification of the term ' Mind ' itself. 



This is no question of choice, but one of absolute 

 necessity. The meaning of the word ' Mind ' must be very 

 considerably enlarged, so as to enable us to comprise under 

 its new and more ample signification the results of all nerve- 

 actions, other than those of outgoing currents. We 

 should thus include as ' mental phenomena,' the functional 

 results of all nerve actions on the side of ingoing currents 

 and in the nerve centres whether these nerve actions 

 are accompanied by a recognizable conscious phasis, or 

 whether they form what appear to be mere physical links 

 (or " organic states of the nerves ") between other nerve 

 actions which are unquestionably in relation with definite 

 Conscious States. 



We thus include under the word * Mind ' all those well- 

 known results of nerve action which are comprised under 

 the general categories of (1) Feeling, Sensation or 

 Emotion, (2) Intelligence, Instinct or Thought, and (3) 



