194 SENSATION, IDEATION, AND PERCEPTION. 



in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu ' was being 

 repeated some two centuries ago as an embodiment of the 

 reigning philosophical creed concerning the ' Origin of 

 Ideas,' it was with justice that Leibnitz added * nisi 

 intellectus ipse,' if we take this latter phrase, as we may, 

 in accordance with Spencer's luminous view, to represent 

 the possibilities of intellectual affection and action be- 

 queathed to an organism in the already elaborated nervous 

 system which it inherits. Within this nervous system 

 lie latent the creature's ' forms of Intuition/ or ' forms of 

 Thought,' which need only the coming of appropriate 

 stimuli to rouse them into harmonious action. It is the 

 fact of the previous orderly organization of the structural 

 correlatives of mental processes, which causes some degree 

 5>f those modes of mental affection, known to us as Feeling, 

 Intellectual Action, Emotion, or Volition, to be engen- 

 dered even in the young untaught organism in response 

 to suitable stimuli. 



Thus the several mental ' faculties ' may be said to have 

 been making their appearance, and gradually becoming 

 more distinct, during the whole period in which a build- 

 ing-up and organization of Nervous Systems has been in 

 progress. 



