530 MILITARY STRENGTH OF THE INDUS FRONTIER. 



which took a very unfavourable view of our In- 

 dian frontier question, " should the Russians be 

 permitted to advance to the Hindu Kush, either north 

 of Cabul, or south of Waklan" and it asserted that " to 

 talk about the Indus valley now (as a line of defence) 

 is to be 13 years behind the time." In the course of 

 a discussion by letters in the Times and other news- 

 papers, however, Lord Chelmsford (who no doubt had 

 had under his consideration all that had been said on the 

 other side, in the newspaper controversy then going on) 

 makes the following rejoinder: 



" No period of time can alter the natural strength of the 

 Indus Valley frontier. With the advanced posts of Quetta 

 and Peshawar, giving us the command of both flanks of the 

 Indus, and with a belt of most difficult country 200 miles 

 broad, between the natural border of Afghanistan and the 

 unfordable Indus River, which can only be bridged with the 

 greatest difficulty during 6 months of the year ; India possesses 

 a defensible frontier of extraordinary strength" and (His 

 Lordship concludes with these words,) " I am strongly of 

 opinion that the natural difficulties of our North West frontier, 

 which can be so enormously increased by artificial means, 

 are quite sufficient to secure India from any successful attempt 

 at invasion." * 



This is a highly important matter ; we shall therefore 

 quote the opinion of another most distinguished general 

 officer on the same subject. In a letter to the Times ^ 

 General Sir John Adye has also expressed w r hat is 

 practically a similar view of this case, and says, 



"our North West frontier from its natural difficulties is 

 very safe and almost impregnable." " His (Mr. C's) views 

 on the supposed danger of India are exaggerated and unsound. 



* Extracts from letter in the London Times of Aug. 21, 1893, p. 4, 

 signed "Chelmsford, General." 



