i6o 



The Review of Reviews. 



February 90, 1906. 



merit is not in the Cabinet. Mr. Winston Churchill, 

 who represents the Colonial Office in the House 

 of Commons, is regarded by the public as likely to 

 be much more influential in the decision of Colonial 

 questions than his chief in the Lords. Lord Elgin 

 is a most respectable man. He left India after 

 roy without a stain upon his reputation 

 for good sense, cool judgment, and an entire ab- 

 sence of self-assertion. He presided over the C 

 mission on the South African War with punctuality 

 and civility. But if it had not been for Lord Esher 

 and Sir G. Taubman Goldie, that Commission 

 would have had a most lame and impotent con- 

 clusion. He presided over the small Commission 

 on the Scottish ( lunch difficulty, and his recom- 

 mendations were unimpeachable. I if Mr. 

 Thomas Shaw had not formulated thi om- 

 mendations before the Commission sat. it is doubt- 

 tul whether Lord Elgin would have seen his way 

 quite so clearly. What Thomas Shaw was to Lord 

 Elgin of the Scottish Church controversy, and what 

 Lord Esher was to lord Elgin of the War Com- 

 mission, so it is generally expected Mr. Winston 

 Churchill will be to the new Colonial Secretarv. 

 The Colonial group consists of Lord Elgin, I 

 Carrington and Mr. Sydney Buxton in the Cabinet. 

 and Mr. Winston Churchill outside it. Lord Car- 

 rington has had experience of the Colonies during 

 his governorship in Australia. Mr. Sydne\ Buxton 

 was Under-Secretary for the Coloi - in the last 

 Liberal Administration. The new Government will 

 be sympathetic, almost deferential to the Colonies. 

 In the matter of the Colonial Conference they will 

 disclaim any right to make proposals. The right of 

 initiative belongs to the Colonies. Whatever they 

 propose will be respectfully considered, and if pos- 

 sible their proposals will be acted upon, provided 

 they do not involve either a foreign war or a re- 

 volutionary overturn of the established principles 

 of our fiscal system. 



South Africa is the crux which will have to be 

 faced, and faced at once. The defeated and dis- 

 mayed Jingoes, at whose beh in Bull spent 

 ^250.000.000 in order to secure his hold in South 

 Africa, are already threatening us with the Joss of 

 South Africa if the new Cabinet does not st in 

 the policy of its predecessor in importing continual 

 reinforcements of the Chmese at the mines. This 

 is a question which, will have to be dealt with by 

 the Cabinet as a whole. The Ch question is 

 intimately bo\'nd up with the concession of respon- 

 sible government to the conauered Republics, and 

 that again is not less intimatelv bo^nd up with the 

 question of the payment of o"r just debts to the 

 Boers and the pavment of compensation. Probably 

 the sdnplest way would be for the new Government 

 to suspend at once, pend ; n<z inauirv. any further 

 importation of Chinese to South A/rca. nnd to des- 

 patch a small but strong commission of inquiry to 

 report upon the three questions: (iV What is the 



exact position of the Chinese labourers (a) from 

 their own point of view, and (b) from the point of 

 view of the population of the Transvaal? (2) What 

 amount of money is really due to the Boers? and 

 (3) What is the best, safest and quickest way of es- 

 tablishing responsible government in the Orange 

 Free State and the Transvaal ? 



Such a Commission, if sent out in February, could 

 report before midsummer. Until then nothing would 

 need to be done. But before the Session closed it 

 might be possible to act upon the recommendations 

 of the Commission. Without venturing to anticipate 

 what they would recommend, it seems to me that 

 Liberals will fail in their duty if they do not (1) 

 devote the promised contribution from the Trans- 

 vaal to the cost of the war to the discharge of all our 

 financial obligations to the victims of the war; (2) 

 provide for the establishment of responsible govern- 

 ment in L>oth the Republics In-fore Christmas; and (3) 

 while suspending the importation of any more Chin- 

 ese, relegate the win vie question of the emplovment 

 and treatment of the Chinese to the new responsible 

 Government of the Colony. 



The Indian group in the Cabinet consists of Mr. 

 ley. who is a novice. Lord Elgin, and Lord 

 Ripon-, \\h<> have both been Vic ind Sir Henry 



Fowler, who has l*-en Secretary of State for India. 

 They have the disadvantage of having a Viceroy not 

 of their appointing, who was sent out to allow Lord 

 Kitchener to rule the roost in India. Mr. Morley 

 will not have a bed of roses. He will have to faoe 

 a new [ndia, an India whose inhabitants have been 

 flushed with pride over the victories of Japan, and an 

 India whose inhabitants are just waking up to the 

 t resources of the weak against armed force-— the 

 Boycott and the Strike. He will have to make up 

 his mind whether to confirm or to reverse the decision 

 of Mr. Brcdrick. which sustained Lord Kitchener 

 against Lord Curzon and the opinion of the whole 

 Civil Service of India. He will have to decide 

 whether he will abide by the decision of his 

 predecessor as to the partition of Bengal. He will 

 probably think it is the line of least re- 

 sistance to assume that what is done cannot 

 be undone, and therein he may make the mistake of 

 his life. For. if the Bengalees profit by the Russian 

 example. Mr. Morley may find himself confronted 

 by a far thornier problem than faced Mr. Forster in 

 Ireland in the worst days of the Land League. 

 Finally, Mr. Morley will have to take his courage in 

 both his hands, and insist upon a drastic reduction 

 of military expenditure in India. The military 

 budget in India has been raised to its present figure 

 solely because of the alleged Russian menace. 

 Whatever the Russian debacle has done, it has at 

 least freed India from all dread of a Russian inva- 

 sion. Tt ought, therefore, to follow that at least 

 two millions a year ought to be withdrawn from the 

 military budget, to be used either in the reduction of 

 taxation or in the extension of popular education. 



