Review of Reviews, 20/2/06. 



Leading Articles, 



175 



WHY GERMAN DIPLOMACY HAS FAILED. 



The Iron Chancellor and His Successors. 



The foreign reviews for December contain several 

 articles on German Diplomacy. There are two in 

 the Deutsche Revue, and the first, a study of " Bis- 

 marck's Statesmanship and Foreign Policy," by A. 

 von Brauer, serves as introduction to a discussion of 

 this present important question in Germany. 



THE GERMAN LEADERSHIP. 



Diplomacy, according to Prince Bismarck, is not 

 a science but an art. His great aim was to con- 

 vince the world that German leadership in Europe 

 was better than a French, or a Russian, or an Eng- 

 lish leadership, and it seems to the writer of the 

 article that the past century showed this ideal to 

 be the right one. The twenty-four years of German 

 leadership, he says, were about the happiest of the 

 century, both for Germany and the other European 

 States. 



BISMARCKIAN MAXIMS. 



Bismarck desired that his policv should always 

 be honourable and straightforward. The writer pro- 

 ceeds to characterise it as a policy of moderation, 

 caution, and practical necessity, and mentions as 

 Bismarckian maxims the waiting for the right mo- 

 ment, the adoption of no half measures, letting no 

 opportunities be lost, and allowing no grudges to 

 be entertained against other statesmen, or sympathies 

 or antipathies towards individual States. The 

 Chancellor's Foreign Policy, concludes Herr von 

 Brauer, was undoubtedly more brilliant before and 

 during the Franco-German War than it was in the 

 years which followed, but in his later years his 

 statecraft was technically more perfect as his task- 

 was more difficult. 



diplomatic neurasthenia. 

 In his article on German Diplomacy in the first 

 December number of La Revue, Alexandre Ular 

 naturally begins with some observations on the Bis- 

 marckian system, adding that unfortunately for Ger- 

 many the utility of this method disappeared with 

 Bismarck himself. This, however, was mere coinci- 

 dence. The conditions for which the Bismarckian 

 diplomacy was created had ceased to exist ; that is 

 to say, the military hegemony of the Hohenzollerns 

 was at an end. But the spirit of the Bismarckian 

 diplomacy, continues M. Ular, could not easily be 

 exorcised, and as the method of Bismarck permitted 

 to the diplomatists a somewhat military attitude, 

 Germany was not represented so much as German 

 prestige. There were, in fart, no other traditions, 

 and hence, for the last fifteen years, the foreign 

 policy of Germany has been conducted by men with 

 all the qualities for making peace with a vanquished 

 foe, but without any of the essential qualities to 

 negotiate victories without war. That is the cause 

 of the apparent enigmatical character of Germany's 

 international policy. 



But this diplomatic neurasthenia has nothing to 

 do with the psychology of the Kaiser. His plans of 

 international action show marvellous continuity, but 

 excellent as they are from the German point of 

 view, they are frequently spoilt because the indis- 

 pensable instrument to execute them is defective. 

 He resembles an inventor without the means to 

 carry out his idea, a genial financier without a 

 farthing, a Paganini without a violin. 



THE KAISER AS A DIPLOMATIST. 



Another reason for Germany's failures in dip- 

 lomacy is that the Kaiser himself takes the actual 

 direction of foreign affairs, assuming legislative and 

 executive powers at the same time. That he has 

 many brilliant ideas cannot be denied, but he does 

 not know how to carry them out, and he is aware 

 of his lack of success, but not of the causes of his 

 failure. He uses his Bismarckism against the other 

 Great Powers as Don Quixote used his lance against 

 windmills. Diplomacy is not his metier, but in the 

 military Bismarck epoch his schemes would have 

 become masterpieces. 



If not to the Kaiser or to the German diplo- 

 matists, to whom then does Germany owe her recent 

 expansion? To the inferior personnel representing 

 the Empire abroad — consuls, commercial agents, and 

 all who exercise practical diplomacy, representing 

 Germany and not the Kaiser's ideas, and defending 

 the interests of Germans, and not the aspirations of 

 a government separated from the people by aristo- 

 cratic conditions. It is these semi-diolomatists who 

 have expanded Germany, often in spite of " high 

 diplomacy." 



SURVIVAL OP THE UNFIT. 



Then there is the fatal tradition that the Hohen- 

 zollerns in foreign capitals must not be represented 

 by men who have nothing but brains to recommend 

 them. As the noblest and wealthiest are selected 

 to fill these posts, the choice is necessarily limited ; 

 and as these men are sure of their posts, they dis- 

 dain to make the slightest effort to show themselves 

 competent. 



M. U'.ar returns to the Moroccan affair, which, 

 he says, synthesises in an extraordinary manner 

 the defects and the good sides of the Kaiser's dip- 

 lomacy ; and, in conclusion, advises the Kaiser to 

 procure a few English diplomatists or give up con- 

 ceiving great scheme-.. 



In the January number of the Woman at Home 

 Miss fane T. Stoddarl continues the Life of the Em- 

 press Eugenie, bringing the story down to March, 

 1856. when the Prince Imp-rial was born. The 

 chr ; strn:iiL, r of the Prince i,>ok place at Notre Dame 

 in the following June, and on the occasion Pi 

 Pius IX. pr< sented the Kmpress with the golden 

 rose, which she treasured in her bedchamber at the 

 Tuileries till 1870. 



