The Progress of the World. 



549 



One tine Wednesday afleinoon in 

 How It was June an Englishman, whose card 

 Brought About, declared that lie was physician 

 to the Sultan of Morocco, called 

 at my oflice on his way to Berlin. He told a very 

 straightforward story, for which he said he had the 

 direct personal authority of the Sultan. He said 

 that he was the last European to leave Vm before the 

 roads were closed. He told me with much detail 

 that France had decided the time had come to tear 

 up the Treaty of Algeciras and anne.>c Morocco. Her 

 intentions were perfectly well known in Fez and also 

 in .Madrid. For the first year or two after the 

 signature of the Treaty of Aigeciras the conduct of the 

 French had been perfectly correct. But for the last 

 two years they had deliberately set themselves to violate 

 its provisions and to pave ihe way for the seizure of the 

 country. The army had been allowed to go to pieces, 

 the personal prestige of the Sultan hati been under- 

 mined, rebellions had been promoted among the 

 tribes, and the hour had now come lor a raid on Fez. 

 The whole story of the danger of Europeans in Fez 

 was a i)ut-up job. The French ai;er/is proroccitt-tirs 

 had engineered the insurrection in order to atTord an 

 excuse for the seizure of the capital. All this, iriy 

 'nformant assured me, was perfectly well known to the 

 Sultan, who, however, was powerless, and to the 

 Clerman representatives in Fez, whose conduct had 

 been irreproachable. He warned me, as I understood 

 he had also warned the Foreign Office, that a 

 dangerous crisis was on the point of arising between 

 France and Germany, and that Britain might very 

 easily be involved in war. I was much impressed 

 with his communication, and sent a full note of it to 

 a morning ]japer, the editor of which, however, for 

 private reasons, did not see fit to publish it, an excess 

 of caution on his part which deprived his paper of 

 the kudos of publishing exclusive information in 

 advance of what was to ha|)|)en. 



1-verything came about as the 



Sir Edwnrd Grey's '"^u'tan's doctor had predicted. The 



First Blunder. French sent a column of troops, 



which seized the capital of 

 Morocco. The Spaniards followed suit by occupy- 

 ing a province contiguous to their frontier. Sir 

 Edward GrL'y, who appears to have been misled by 

 reports from his agents in Fez, declared his ajiproval 

 of the action of the French. Whether it was 

 necessary or not, it was certainly not sanctioned by 

 the Treaty of .Mgeciras, and ought not to have been 

 allowed to pass without immediate appeal to all the 

 signatories o( that lnaty. .As it was, Sir IvKvard ( Irey 



touk uiK)n himsell, dominaiLd us always by his morbid 

 diead of oflfending the French, to give his public 

 and emphatic approval to the action of France. None 

 of the other signatories, save Germany and Spain, 

 appear to have taken any notice of the occupation of 

 Fez. The apathetic indifference of the other Powers, 

 especially of the Government of the United States, to 

 the violation of the Treaty which they had signed 

 only five years before is one of the most deplorable 

 and inexplicable circumstances connected with the 

 whole bad business. Spain struck in on her own 

 account, believing that the general scramble had 

 begun. Germany followed her bad example. Her 

 true course was lo have promptly protested against 

 the action of the French and to have appealed to all 

 the signatories of the Treaty of Aigeciras lo decide 

 what should be done. If they could not have agreed 

 the matter ought to have been sent to arbitration. 

 Unfortunately, instead of taking this straightforward 

 course, which was alike dictated by treaty faith and 

 her own interests, Germany expressly declared she 

 would not protest against the action of the French. 

 She then sent the Paiitlur to Agadir and waited to 

 see what would turn up. 



The sending of the Faiilltcr was a 



The "Panther" s[gp which everyone, even in (Jer- 



Agadlr. many, can now see was a mistake. 



It was probably the result of inde- 

 cision. The Germans had been led to believe by the 

 warm welcome given to the Kaiser on his visit lo 

 London that England would no longer regard German 

 actions with a malevolent eye. To send the J'aniAer 

 to Agadir was a popular move in Germany. It was 

 acclaimed by the Jingoes as a sign that Germany was 

 about to assert herself with energy. It was capable 

 of that interpretation ; but it could also be explained 

 as a mere measure of precaution for the protection of 

 more or less mythical German subjects and interests 

 in South Morocco. It was an unmistakable hint to 

 France that if she meant to hold on to Fez Germany 

 would have a word lo say in the final settlement. Jt 

 was what is vulgarly called a " try on," to .see what 

 would happen. Hence when Ijigland took alarm 

 and asked what it meant, the German Government 

 could not tell them, for the simple reason that the 

 German Government did not know. There is also 

 reason lo believe that at first the German Government 

 was disi)Osed lo take up the attitude that l-ngland had 

 already been compensated by France by concessions 

 in Egypt, whereas Germany, having received no 

 coaipensations anywhere, was justified in dealing 

 directly with France. 



