550 



Thil Rkview of Reviews. 



The misfortune of the Agadir ■' 



No Naval Base incident was that it alarmed Sir 

 for . . 



Germany. Edward Grey. Agadir is an open 



roadstead, wnicli could only be 

 converted into a naval base by an expenditure 

 of many millions. Hence, when the Pautli,-r 

 ajjpcared there, the first instinct of the militant 

 section of the Cabinet was to send a British 

 warship to keep her company. After a severe con- 

 flict in the Cabinet this proposil was abandoned. 

 But as a compromise it was decided to be vigilant 

 and to take the first opjjortuiiity of asserting the 

 determination of the British Government to have a 

 voice in the settlement. On the top of the .Agadir 

 incident came the story that the Germans were 

 demanding the whole of the French Congo from 

 France. 'J'his would have given them another naval 

 base, and it seems to have been this scare of a 

 German naval base in Africa that was the catisa 

 causans of Mr. Lloyd George's memorable speech. 

 There was nothing in the speech but a truism, but 

 uttered when it was, and by the man who made it, 

 the speech resounded through Europe as a hardly 

 veiled declaration of war. 



This question of a naval base lies 

 The Question ,.,t the root of the whole con- 

 Nava! Bases. troversy between England and 



Germany. Germany has a world 

 ivide commerce only second to our own. She has 

 "olonies or colonial stations in China, in the South 

 Seas, in New Guinea, and in Africa. But between 

 Kiel and the Cameroons she has no station where her 

 ships can coal or refit. Germany has repeatedly 

 tried to obtain naval bases oversea. When she tried 

 to obtain one in the Persian Gulf she was told that we 

 should regard such an acquisition on her part as an 

 unfriendly act. \\'hen she tried to obtain a port in the 

 Red Sea, the Turks, fearing our displeasure, refused 

 to deal. An attempt to obtain a foothold in Madeira 

 was checked by Portugal, relying upon the support of 

 England, who on that occasion was so near action 

 that all leave was stopped in the fleet and everything 

 was in readiness for instant war. Sir Edward Grey 

 evidently thinks that it is necessary to prevent Germany 

 obtaining any naval base anywhere oversea. This was 

 not Lord Salisbury's opinion. He favoured Germany 

 obtaining a naval base in the Mediterranean, holding 

 that the acquisition of stations oversea rendered 

 Germany less formidable regarded as a possible 

 enemy. Such stations lead to a scattering of forces at 

 present concentrated in the North Sea, and ofter points 

 of attack for an enemy possessing superior sea-power. 



If we are to have an entente with 



The Price Germany we shall have to abandon 



German Entente, 'he theory that British interests 



demand the shutting out of Ger- 

 many from any of the few remaining ports in the 

 world which are available for naval bases. Whether 

 we take Lord Salisbury's view or Sir Edward Grey's, 

 it is unreasonable to expect that the second sea-power 

 in Europe is to be for ever deprived of any oppor- 

 tunity to acquire by legitimate means any foothold in 

 any of the seven seas. It may be more convenient 

 for us that she should not have them. But if we are 

 going to lay it down as an axiom of British policy 

 that she shall never have them, then whatever we may 

 say about our desire for an entente and good relations 

 with Germany is all wasted breath. If we want an 

 entente we must let her have naval bases abroad. 

 Unless we do we shall never have an entente. Here 

 is a sharp antagonism of interests. The price may 

 be too high for an entente. Well and good ; if it is so 

 decided, then the Germanophobe school that dominates 

 our diplomacy and our bureaucracy w'ill have it all its 

 own way. But that is not my opinion, nor do I think 

 it is the opinion of the British people. 



It is now possible, with the aid of 



The Course the Statements of Sir Edward Grey 



Negotiations. and Count Kiderlin-Waechter, to 



follow in chronological order the 

 course of the negotiations between the two govern- 

 ments, which were complicated by the fact that 

 Germany was ail the while negotiating not so much 

 with us as with France. Whenever France felt they 

 were getting " bested" they appear to have pulled Sir 

 Edward (irey's leg, and Sir Edward Grey never 

 failed to respond. The course of events appears to 

 have been as follows : — 



June 30. — Telegr;ims dcspatclicil from Berlin announcing tire 

 Piinl/u-r's deparlurc for Agadir. 



lulv I. Saturday. — Count Mellernich informs .Sir K. Grey 

 the provisions of \ci of Alyeciras had become nuyalovy. 

 Cicrmany did not ol.iect to Freucli oeciipntion of Fez, nor did 

 she intend to e.\postulale with France for her action, lim 

 Germany was compelled to undcrlake the proteclion of German 

 subjccls in Southern Morocco until onlerly conditions were 

 restored in the country. As soon as former quiet was restored 

 ship would leave Agadir. She would negotiate directly with 

 France as to a fnial understanding on the Morocco question, 

 which will also be in accordance with the interests of the other 

 signa'ory Towers. 



July 3. Monday.— Sir E. Grey informed Count Metternicli 

 that he and Asquiih regarded the situation as serious and 

 important, and had called a Cabinet. 



July 4. Tuesday. — Cabinet meeting. Proposal to send 

 British cruiser to Agadir rejected after hot debate. After 

 Cabinet Grey informs Metternicli despatch of faiitlicr had 

 created new situation. Our aliitiide coidd not be a dis- 

 interested one. Hound to consider treaty obligations and our 

 own interests. I'urthir developments might aflcct British 



