Leading Articles in the Reviews. 



579 



THE ITALIAN RAID ON TRIPOLI. 



How It was Engineered and Carried Out. 



" Ignotus " has a vexy instructive and illuQiinating 

 article in the Forlnlghtly Rciiew on- " Italian 

 Nationalism and the War with Turkey." 



HOW THE WAR WAS GOT UP. 



He regards the attack on Tripoli as the result of 

 a Nationalist agitation, largely journalistic in its origin, 

 which was a reaction against the dominance of the 

 •Socialist party, which "has everywhere adopted an 

 attitude of hostility to militarism. Imperialism, and 

 patriotism, and professes to be internationalist and 

 pacificist, and regards class hatred and civil disorders 

 as the only moral and praiseworthy forms of warfare." 



Successive Cabinets had been for years under the 

 thumb of the Socialist demagogues. The Nationalist 

 movement seems to have been quite as much directed 

 against Austria as against Turkey. Its first victory 

 was to prohibit emigration to the Argentine Republic. 

 That it was ultimately diverted to Tripoli was due to 

 .\gadir. It was not till September 20th that the 

 expedition was finally decided upon. " Ignotus " 

 says :— 



The heart of the whole nation was in the enierprise. Even 

 many prominent Socialists, casting the shackles of parly fealty 

 to the winds, declared themselves in favour of the Goyernmenl's 

 .\frican policy and accepted the occup.ition of Tripoli as a 

 necessity for the country, while the Clericals were even more 

 enthusiastic. 



Humph ! We shall be in a better position to speak 

 about that ne.xt month. 



HOW THE RAID WAS CARRIED OUT. 



Mr. Archibald Hurd, in the same Review, has a 

 most comforting and conclusive article showing how 

 the Italian invasion of Tripoli has justified all those 

 who maintain that it is impossible for Germany 

 suddenly to throw 70,000 men on our shores. Italy 

 enjoyed : — 



(1) Absolute and permanent command of the sea ; 



(2) Over a million tons of steam shipping capable of being 

 utilised for army transport ; and 



(3) A vast military organisation numbering about one and a 

 quarter million men. 



The ultimatum was handed to the Turkish Government on 

 September 2Slh, when the Italian fleet had already l)een 

 inubilised for over a week. The 6rst detachment of the expe- 

 ditionary force was not landed in Tripoli until twelve d.iys 

 later, and the disembarkation was not completed until the 22nd 

 or 23rd of Oclol>er — a period of three weeks ami four ilaysfiom 

 the lime -.vhen the ultimatum was issueil — and even then there is 

 no evidence that all the artillery and stores had been got ashore, 

 so that probably the actual period was at least a month. 



I^t it be remcmlxrred that Italy transported only 25,000 

 men, that she enjoyed througluiul absolute command of the 

 sea, and that the transports had to cover only four or five 

 bundled miles, and what ir.usl be the verdict upon Lord 

 Uoberls's alarms? 



Now Italy has put the last nail in the conspiracy to frighten 

 the British people into a system of conipulsory military service 

 which is alien to their temper, opposed to their interests, unne- 

 cessary from a defensive point of viiw, and subversive to the 

 policy on which our relations with Kuropc now rest. 



" Every Calculation Miscarried." 

 " Kepi," writing from Tripoli, gives in /i/,id-7i'ooJ 

 I full account of the Italian campaign. It will be by 



no means pleasant reading for Italy. Speaking of the 

 massacres, he says the result was a retribution upon 

 the Arabs which will live in the memory of Tripoli- 

 taine for generations, and which will react for many a 

 vear upon the perpetrators themselves. In contracting 

 their front and retiring the line about a mile while 

 they cabled to Italy for another infantry division, the 

 Italians, says " Kepi," committed about the two worst 

 military measures that could have been undertaken. 

 The first depressed their troops and elated the enemy : 

 the second will only increase the sickness of the con- 

 gested army. " In short, every calculation that Italian 

 statesmen made when they decided to engage upon 

 this Tripoli adventure has miscarried." -'What 

 Turkey should really hope is that Italy will be driven 

 to land an army either in Anatolia or Macedonia, for 

 as sure as she does this she will pay Turkey a War 

 Indemnity." 



VicTORV OR Death for Italy. 

 Dr. Dillon, in the Conkmporary Review, reports 

 that the governing Turks in Constantinople arc 

 confident that they can wait, as time is on their side. 

 Tripoli is five times the size of Italy, but at the 

 present moment Italian soldiers dare not venture to a 

 distance of three miles into the interior. It will take 

 ten to fifteen years of steady work in peace lime 

 before Italy can make anything of Tripoli. l>r. 

 Dillon himself, however, says that Italy must at an\ 

 cost carry on the war until she wins ; if she fails to 

 effect annexation she will cease to be a great Power. 

 But he says although the war does not cost the Turks 

 as much as it costs the Italians, nevertheless it .has 

 entailed very heavy expenditure and dislocation of 

 trade and industry. He thinks that in the end the 

 Powers will probably compel the Turks to yield. 

 Sir Harry Johnston's Views. 

 \\'riting in the Nineteenth Century on Europe and 

 the Mohammedan World, Sir Harry Johnston says 

 that, academically, Italy's action is without any logical 

 defence. The practical plea of the Italian is that 

 Austro-Germany has for the last two ye.irs been con- 

 templating a commercial and political intervention in 

 the aflairs of the Tripolitaine, which, if unhindered, 

 would have led to the creation of a German sphere 

 of influence extending from the coast of Tripoli to the 

 heart of the Sudan : — 



The only excuse which Italy can give for her outrage on inter- 

 national law would be to show that if she had failed to take action 

 immediately after the raising of the Morocco question In 

 Germany, she would have had later on to acquiesce in the fm: 

 nci\>mpli of an Austro-German sphere of influence on coas'- 

 of the Mediterranean immediately opposite her shores. I'n- 

 doubtcdly such a position as this would have been detrimental 

 to Italian interests, would have for ever hemmed in Italy as a 

 si.cond-class Power with no chance of expansion. That, at 

 least, is the Italian point of view, though it may be get'.ins; 

 somewhat out of date. 



Whether Italy will prove to )je capable of the task 

 she has iniiwscd on herself is a very different 

 question : — , ,. .. 



.\t any rate, Italy, whether of no she has made a false step, 

 must now go on with the task to ihe bitter end, at no matter 

 what cost in men and money, for if she were lo confess failure 



