Leading Articles in the Reviews. 



581 



AT THE PARTING OF THE WAYS. 

 Is AN Enikme Willi German V l.Mrossiiii.ii? 



Un November 20th Mr. W. T. Stead addressed a ■ 

 letter to the I'rcss, which appeared in full in the 

 Siiindani, the Manchester Guan/iaii, and the South 

 IVaks Daily News, and in part in some other papers, 

 on the bubject of our foreign policy. The vital part 

 of this letter was as follows : — 



It is a far cry ftoiu a natural dissatisfaction with a niislakcn 

 application of a foreign policy to a total ropiKliation of that 

 policy as a whole. It is common ground with all Liherals that 

 It is a scandal and a danger that our relations with Germany 

 have become so strained. But to attribute these strained relations 

 to the enlfiik policy in itself is to put the saddle on the wrong 

 horse. It would have been perfectly possible to have carried out 

 the enUntc polity with loyally to our friends if we had drawn 

 the line of our support where it ought to have been drawn, at 

 the definite authoiiiative frontier laid down by the treaties 

 which constitute the public law of Europe. No entaiU w ith any 

 one or two Powers justifies our acquiescence in their breaches of 

 treaty faith. If Sir lidward Grey had refused to acquiesce in the 

 violation of the Treaty of Algeciras involved in the French 

 ■-eizure of I'Cz, there would have been no Agadir incident. If 

 he had refused to acquiesce in the violation of the Treaty of 

 I'aris, involved in the Italian seizure of Tripoli, there would 

 have been no war with Turkey. Neither of these betrayals of 

 our public trust was essential to the maintenance of the policy 

 I if cnunlcs. All the mischief arose from allowing a perfectly 

 ^ound general principle of action to carry us into a region 

 fenced otT by treaties to which we had put our hands. To 

 engage to be good friends, to help each other in tilling our 

 own gardens, and even to defend our plots from predatory 

 attack does not carry with it an obligation to assist our com- 

 rades in plunder raids upon our neighbours' orchards. It is 

 only this abuse of the tutfiile policy which has brought it into 

 discredit. But if it be restricted in future within the limits of 

 treaty faith, there is no reason why this great inheritance of the 

 IMnardian reign should be discarded. 



But it is argued we want to be friends with Germany and that 

 is impossible so long as the <w(/^«/c policy is maintained. 



Germany has never made any complaint of our ciitcnU with 

 I-'rance. Neither has she ever made any objection to our build- 

 ing as many Dreadnoughts as we pleased. If we m.-ide it 

 perfectly clear that out i-«/i:«/i does not involve our complicity 

 m infractions of the Trealy Law of Jiurope, we should not find 

 it difficult to supplement our ententes with France and Kussia 

 by a third entente with the German Empire. 



It is well, however, to look facts in the face and to recognise 

 iliat if the lirilish Government wants an entente with Germany 

 it must be pic])ated to pay the price, although that i)rice is 

 neither the alandonmcnt of the entente eonliitle nor the surrender 

 ..f the " two keels-to-one " standard of British naval supremacy. 

 Neither does Germany w.ant colonics for the overflow of her 

 -urplus population. Germany has no surplus population. She 

 haa not sufficient population for her own needs at home. .She 

 wants immigrants, not emigrants. But Germany* does want 

 >omelhing, and it is because wc have uniformly and persistently 

 thwarted her efforts to obtain that something that there is the 

 antagonism bciween us, which we all profess to deplore. 



What Germany waiiti is coaling-stations oversea. She has a 

 world-wide commerce only second to our ow n. She has a 

 great and growing navy for the protection of that world-wide 

 commerce. In order to enable that navy to operate in all the 

 ^eas of the world it is absolutely necessary for tjermany to have 

 slaiions beyond the seas where her cruisers can replenish their 

 bunkers, obtain supplies and repair, and be refitted. Bui 

 whenever Germany endeavours to obtain a coaling-station, 

 Britain blocks the way. It is that doginlhe-manger policy 

 .«nd nol the maintenance i^f the French entente that is the real 

 olwtaclc in the way of an entente cordtale with Germany. 



The question for Groat Hriliin to consider to-day is simply 

 lliis. .\re we or are wr not dcttrniincd to regard as an 



unfriendly act any and every attempt made by Germany to 

 obtain a coaling and refilling station on any of the great ocean 

 routes traversed night and day by the German mercantile 

 marine? There are very few pons left in the world which can 

 be secured by purchase or by treaty. We have long ago taken 

 possession of all the most eligible sites. Arc we to persist in 

 denying to Germany the right to obtain by legitimate means a 

 foothold in any nation or on any coastline oversea? If wc are, 

 then farewell to any hope of an entente with Germany ! In 

 that case it would be midsummer madness to abandon our 

 entente with France. If that resulted, as it might, in a rap- 

 {■roeltement between France ami Germany, it would render it 

 impossible for us single-handed to maintain our veto. But if we 

 recognise that Germany has a legitimate claim to have coaling- 

 stations, if she can obtain them by arrangement, then there is 

 no reason why an entente with Germany should not be as 

 cordial as that with France. 



I will not enter into the question whether the existence of 

 such German naval stations oversea would strengthen or weaken 

 Germany as a possible enemy. I will merely remark that it 

 would certainly dissipate her naval forces, which are now 

 penned up w ithin striking distance of our shores, and so long as 

 we maintain the present relative status quo of two keels to one 

 they would be at least as much hostages for good behaviour as 

 additions to striking force. 



Has the Anglo-French Entente Failed? 

 In the Fortnightly Rrvieiv Mr. Sydney Low discusses 

 the same question. He questions the wisdom of the 

 .\nglo-French entente : — 



Its success so far cannot be called brilliant. For thirty years 

 before 1904 France and Germany were in no danger of coming 

 'to blows ; they contrived to get on together without excessive 

 friction; and their relations were ste-idily improving. In the p.asl 

 seven years the clock has been set back. France and Germany 

 have three times found themselves on the very brink of war. 

 When we left the two countries to settle their own relations they 

 adjusted them without ditticulty. Since we have taken sides 

 as the patron, ally, benevolent adviser, or whatever our precise 

 function may be, of one of them, they have hardly ceased 

 quarrelling. 



GER.MANV'S NEED FOR COAHNO STATIONS. 



.\Ir. Low has some very pertinent observations as 

 to the possibility of iiiLeting Germany on the basis of 

 recognising the justice of her demand for coaling 

 stations. He says : — 



It is futile to imagine that we can for ever prevent Germany 

 Ironi obtaining, like England, and France, and other naval 

 Powers, some suitable naval stations outside Europe. .Vnd it 

 is surely the most sensible course to let her get them in regions 

 where they are the least likely to interfere with us, such as the 

 .\tlantic coast of Morocco. It was the opinion of the late Lord 

 Salisbury that Germany should be permitted to secure a coaling 

 station in the Mediterranean, his reason being that this would 

 at once gratify German ambition and render her more vulnerable 

 to us in time of war. Mr. Balfour took the same view when 

 he allowed the Russians to occupy Port Arthur. The fact is 

 that every outlying port or island in the possession of a 

 potential adversary is a hostage given to the owners of the 

 greatest navy : it provides us with a point where we can get 

 Into cont.act with them. The more .\gadirs Germany has to 

 lose the more likely is she to keep the peace with us. Moreover 

 the acquisition of such outstalions would le.id to the dispersal 

 and diffusion of the German navy. .\s long as we insist on 

 bottling up Germany, we keep her whole maritime force 

 concentrated round her home ports within a few houis' steam 

 of our own ; with the result that our navy is used up in coast- 

 guard dutyofi' these islands, and our flag has almost disappeared 

 from the ocean. By all means let (letmany spretid ; if only 

 that we may be spared the undignified spectacle of the fleets ol 

 Britain huddling round our shores like frightened chickens 

 about the hen-coop. 



