Review of Reviews, ?0/S/06. 



The Indeterminate Sentence. 



237 



Mr. Barrows answers the question as to how indi- 

 vidual liberty can be guarded by saying that it can 

 be secured by having the judiciary represented on 

 all boards of parole. For instance, in New York, 

 in connection with the reformatory for misde- 

 meanour, the Board is composed of nine members, 

 four of whom are Judges from the courts of New 

 York, which commit misdemeanants to this institu- 

 tion. 



Moreover, with regard to so-called incorrigibles, 

 provision could be made that, at stated periods, the 



question of conditional release might come up for 

 review, with the right of appeal from the prisoner 

 to a Parole Board, on which judicial, medical and 

 administrative authority should be represented. 



The whole article is one which deserves the at- 

 tention of every reformer on these lines throughout 

 these States. We have advocated it, feeling sure it 

 would effect the solution of a great many of the 

 difficulties which we now experience in connection 

 with our criminals, and the experience which Ame- 

 rica is gaining in this respect only confirms our 

 belief in its efificacy. 



REPRESENTATIVE REFORM. 



Mr. Marshall Hudson, N.Z., writes: — 



I have read with much interest Prof. Nanson's 

 article in the January number of the " Review," en- 

 titled, " What is the Voice of the Commonwealth ?" 



If I understand Professor Nanson aright, he is in 

 favour of some complete and perfected system of 

 proportional representation, such as the Hare- 

 Spence or the Gove systems, being adopted at once 

 by the Commonwealth Parliament. These systems 

 are good in theory and practice, so far as they have 

 been tried, but the difficulty is to get any Govern- 

 ment to make so great a change in one stride. I think 

 that good referendum laws would be an effective 

 remedy, but if that is not to be I would suggest as 

 another alternative the following minimum of elec- 

 toral reform: — 



I St Every electorate should be large enough to 

 return three members, and not so large as to return 

 more than five. 



2nd. Every elector should have but a single vote. 



These tw^o measures, small and simple as they 

 may seem to the thorough-going proportionalist, 

 would probably be sufficient to rid the Common- 

 wealth of most, if not all, of the political corruption 

 that is inherent in the party system. 



For under this arrangement all minorities not 

 smaller than from one-third to one-fifth would be 

 represented, and the dictation of the party boss 

 would be stopped. 



It is true that under this arrangement a good many 

 more votes would be wasted than under a perfected 

 Hare system, but the main objects of the Hare 

 system would be accomplished, and the party sys- 

 tem, having thereby received its death-blow, more 

 elaborate improvements might follow in course of 

 time. 



The plan I propose is simple. It would require 

 no violent disarrangement of the present electoral 

 routine, officials would not have to be carefully in- 

 structed and drilled into the working of a new 

 method, as they would on starting the complete 

 Hare system, and, lastly, the electors' work would 



also be simple — namely, to select one out of perhaps 

 ten candidates, and vote for him. 



While I insist on the necessity of large electoral 

 divisions, as opposed to one-member electorates, I 

 would plead for the smallest plural-membered elec- 

 torates practicable, which I take to be ones return- 

 ing from three to five members each, according to 

 the actual distribution and grouping of the popula- 

 tion in each district. For instance, if a town had 

 the right number of electors to return five members, 

 it would be best to let it stand as a single electorate; 

 if it could return six members, it would be divided 

 into two three-member electorates. 



The advantages of a small plural-membered elec- 

 torate over a large one are, first, that it would be 

 simpler for the voter, as he would not have such a 

 bewilderingly large number of candidates to choose 

 from; and, secondly, there would probably be fewer 

 surplus votes wasted ; and, thirdly, it would not be 

 such a wide departure from present conditions. 



In making these proposals, I am not without 

 support from wise and practical heads, for it would 

 seem that the Japanese Government, when it con- 

 structed its present Constitution, adopted the plural- 

 membered electorate, with the single vote, thus with 

 remarkable insight selecting the most important 

 features of the Hare system, without its more com- 

 plicated details. 



I will now bring another practical head to sup- 

 port my views, and will conclude this letter by a 

 quotation from a pamphlet by R. M. Johnston, 

 Government Statistician, Tasmania, entitled, " Ob- 

 servations of the Working Results of the Hare 

 System of Election in Tasmania." He says, on 

 pages 5 and 6 : — 



The keystone of the Hare System ... is the Hare con- 

 stitution of laree electoral divisions. Without which all 

 the nice arrangements ... of preference and transfer 

 of quota— excesses and lowest excluded candidates' votes, 

 would be a cumbrous farce with the former secured to?ether 

 with even the ordinary one man one rote principle, the 

 results attained would be such an improvement upon 

 methods hitherto prevailins? that they would not fall far 

 snort of the more complete Hare Scheme with i.s metliod 

 of preference and transfer voting." 



