REVIEW OF REVIEWS. 



ilJiiM /( ;, 1913. 



optimistic statesman. M. Novakovitch, 

 the Servian delegate, like his col- 

 leagues, is a man of great diplomatic 

 experience. Montenegro sent Count 

 Voinovitch, Minister of Justice in 

 the tiny monarchy, which is an 

 insignificant member of the League. 

 M. Venezelos, the chief plenipoten- 

 tiary from Greece, is the brain of 

 the Balkan League. He is also the 

 creator of modern Greece, and is re- 

 sponsible for the marvellous renais- 

 sance of that historic land. Himself of 

 Cretan descent, he was some ten years 

 ago the leading man in that troublous 

 island. Since he left Crete he has de- 

 voted himself to the rehabilitation of 

 Greece, and is responsible for the new 

 army and navy which have done so re- 

 markably well in the war. 



Stumbling Blocks. 



Greece had refused to sign the armis- 

 tice on the ground that it was suicidal 

 folly to raise the blockade of the 

 Aegean, and thus allow the Turks to 

 provision their armies with munitions 

 and food ; so the Turkish delegates 

 would not at first agree to the presence 

 of the Hellenic representatives at the 

 Conference. This difficulty took time 

 to overcome, and it was several days 

 before actual terms of peace were dis- 

 cussed. It was speedily evident that 

 agreement was not likely to be 

 reached. The two chief difficulties 

 were Adrianople and the Aegean 

 Islands. Bulgaria insisted that the be- 

 leagured city, her one-time capital, 

 should be ceded to the Allies, Turkey 

 absolutely refused to hear of it. The 

 Allies also declared that the Islands 

 in the Aegean taken by the Greeks 

 should remain in their hands. Turkey 

 herself probably does not care much 

 about these islands one way or the 

 other, the population being almost 

 entirely Greek, but she was prevented 

 from lightly ceding them by the Great 



Powers. The question of these islands 

 some of which have been taken by the 

 Italians and others by the Greeks, 

 \ itall}' affects all those having inter- 

 ests in the Mediterranean. The Powers 

 do not want Turkey to keep the islands 

 so much as they do not want Greece 

 to have them, for fear that the posses- 

 sion of important strategical islands by 

 a small power like Greece, with a 

 weak na\}', is probably but the prelude 

 of their passing into the hands of a 

 great power with a strong navy. Thus 

 does the Concert of Europe make more 

 difficult the conclusion of peace, guided 

 by no idea of justice or equity, purely 

 by the expediency of the moment. 



The Turks Accept Terms. 



Whilst the representatives of the 

 Balkan States and Turkey were endea- 

 vouring to come to terms, another con- 

 ference, composed of ambassadors of 

 the Great Powers in London, was dis- 

 cussing the situation as it affected 

 Europe. When the Peace Plenipoten- 

 tiaries reached a state of deadlock o\er 

 Adrianople the Great Powers stepped 

 in, and on Frida\', 17th January pre- 

 sented a note to the Porte, advising 

 the Ottoman Government to give up 

 Adrianople to the Allies, and leave to 

 the Powers the task of deciding the 

 fate of the Aegean Islands. They of- 

 fered to safeguard Turkish interests 

 in Adrianople, and to guarantee the 

 preservation of mosques and other reli- 

 gious property in the city. The Turkish 

 Government deliberated over this note 

 for several da}'s, but finally a pro- 

 tracted sitting of the Grand Council, 

 composed of some 45 Senators, about 

 40 civil and military dignitaries, and 

 the heir apparent, decided to agree in 

 substanc^e to the suggestions of the 

 Powers, provided these would guara.i- 

 tee that the Balkan League made no 

 further demands. Europe rejoiced, 

 but instp?)d >f this resolve of the Coun- 



