herieui of Revitat, tO/i/aS. 



Leading Articles. 



.i97 



WHY GERMAN DIPLOMACY HAS FAILED. 



Thf. Iron Chancellor and His Successors. 



The foreign reviews have recently contained seve- 

 ral articles on German Diplomacy. There were two 

 in the Deutsche Revue, the first, a study of " Bis- 

 marck's Statesmanship and Foreign Policy,' by A. 

 von Brauer, serving as introduction to a discussion 

 of this present important question in Germany. 



THE GERM.\.N LEADERSHIP. 



Diplomacy, according to Prince Bismarck, is not 

 .1 science but an art. His great aim was to convince 

 the world that German leadership in Europe was 

 Ixftier than a French, or a Russian, or an English 

 leadershi[i, and it seems to the writer of the article 

 that the past century showed this ideal to be the 

 right one. The twenty-four years of German leader- 

 ship, he says, were about the hapf)iest of the cen- 

 tury, both for Germany and the other European 

 States. 



BISMARCKIA^' MAXIMS 



Bismarck desired that his policy should always be 

 honourable and straightforward. The writer pro- 

 ceeds to characterise it as a police of moderation, 

 caution, and practical necessity, and mentions as 

 Bismarckian maxims the waiting for the right mo- 

 ment, the adoption of no half measures, letting no 

 opportunities lie lost, and allowing no grudges to be 

 entertained against other statesmen, or sympathies or 

 antipathies towards individual States. The Chan- 

 cellor's Foreign Policy, concludes Herr von Brauer, 

 was undoubtedly more brilliant before and during 

 the Franco-German War than it was in the years 

 which followed, but in his later years his statecraft 

 was technically more perfect as his task was more 

 diffi<'ult. 



mi'UniATIC NEURASTHENIA. 



In his article on German Diplomacy in the first 

 Decenilver number of La Revue, Alexandre Ular 

 naturally liegins with some observations on the 

 Bismarckian system, adding that, unfortunately for 

 (Jermany, the utility of this method disapi^eared 

 with Bismarck himself. This, however, was mere 

 coincidence. The conditions for which the Bis- 

 marckian diplomacy w as created had ceased to exist ; 

 that is to say, the military hegemony of the Hohen- 

 zoUerns was at an end. But the spirit of the Bis- 

 marckian diplomacy, continues M. Ular, could not 

 easily be exorcised, and as the method of Bismarck 

 permitted to the diplomatists a somewhat military 

 altitude, Germany was not represented so much as 

 German [irestige. There w^ere, in fact, no other 

 traditions, and hence, for the last fifteen years, the 

 foreign policy of Germany has been conducted by 

 men with all the qualities for making peace with a 

 vanquished foe, but without any of the essential 

 qualities to negotiate victories without war. That is 

 the cause of the apparent enigmatical character of 

 Germany's international policy. 



But this diplomatic neurasthenia has nothing to do 

 with the psychology of the Kaiser. His plans of 

 international action show marvellous continuity, but 

 excellent as they are from the German point of view, 

 they are frequently spoilt because the indispensable 

 instrument to execute them is defective. He re- 

 sembles an inventor without the means to carry out 

 his idea, a genial financier without a farthing, a 

 Paganini without a violin. 



THE ICAISER AS A DIPLOMATIST. 



.Another reason for Germany's failures in diplo- 

 macy is that the Kaiser himself takes the actual 

 direction of foreign affairs, assuming legislative and 

 executive ])Owers at the same time. That he has 

 many brilliant ideas cannot be denied, but he does 

 not know how to carry them out, and he is aware of 

 his lack of success, but not of the causes of his 

 failure. He uses his Bismarckism against the other 

 (ireat Powers as Don (Quixote used his lance against 

 windmills. Diplomacy is not his metier, but in the 

 military Bismarck epoch his schemes would have be- 

 come masterpieces. 



If not to the Kaiser or to the German diploma- 

 tists, to whom then does Germany owe her recent 

 expansion ? To the inferior personnel representing 

 the Empire abroad — consuls, commercial agents, and 

 all wiio exercise practical diplomacy, representing 

 Germany and not the Kaiser's ideas, and defending 

 the interests of Germans, and not the aspirations of 

 a government separated from the people by aristo- 

 cratic conditions. It is these semi-diplomatists who 

 have expanded Germany, often in spite of " high 

 diplomacy." 



SURnVAL OF THE UNFIT. 



Then there- is the fatal tradition that the Hohen 

 zoiierns in foreign capitals must not be represented 

 by men who have nothing but brains to recommend 

 them. .\s the noblest and wealthiest are selected to 

 fill these posts, the choice is necessarily limited; 

 and as these men are sure of their posts, they dis- 

 dain to make the slightest effort to show themselves 

 (■omi>t?tent. 



M. Ular returns to the Moroccan affair, which, he 

 says, synthesises in an extraordinary manner the de- 

 fects and the good sides of the Kaiser's diplomac)' ; 

 and, in conclusion, advises the Kaiser to procure a 

 ie\\ English diplomatists or give up conceiving great 

 schemes. 



EUROPE'S RUINOUS HANDICAP. 



Lord Avebury, in the Nineteenth Century, brings 

 up to date the solemn warning addressed by Count 

 Goluchowski many years ago. His subject is the 

 future of Europe. 



PROTECTION. 



The United States of America, with an area of 

 3,550,000 square miles, are set against the disunited 



