PERTAINING TO THE NEGOTIATION OF THE TREATY 



OF GHENT. 



Mr, Monroe to the Envoys Extraordinary and Ministers Plenipo- 

 tentiary of the United States. 



Department of State, June 25, 181J+. 



Gentlemen: No communication has been received from the joint 

 mission which was appointed to meet the commissioners of the British 

 Government at Gottenburg. A letter from Mr. Bayard at Amster- 

 dam, of the 18th of March, was the last from either of our commis- 

 sioners. It was inferred from that letter, and other communications, 

 that Mr. Bayard, Mr. Gallatin, and Mr. Adams, would be in Gotten- 

 burg; and it has been understood from other sources that Mr. Clay 

 and Mr. Russell had arrived there about the 15th of April. It is, 

 therefore, expected that a meeting will have taken place in May, and 

 that we shall soon be made acquainted with your sentiments of the 

 probable result of the negotiation. 



It is impossible, with the lights which have reached us, to ascertain 

 the present disposition of the British Government towards an accom- 

 modation with the United States. We think it probable that the 

 late events in France may have had a tendency to increase its pre- 

 tensions. 



At war with Great Britain, and injured by France, the United 

 States have sustained the attitude founded on those relations. No 

 reliance was placed on the good offices of France in bringing the war 

 with Great Britain to a satisfactory conclusion. Looking steadily to 

 an honorable peace, and the ultimate attainment of justice from both 

 Powers, the President has endeavored, by a consistent and honorable 

 policy, to take advantage of every circumstance that might promote 

 that result. He, nevertheless, knew that France held a place in the 

 political system of Europe and of the world, which, as a check on 

 England, could not fail to be useful to us. What effect the late events 

 may have had, in these respects, is the important circumstance of 

 which you are, doubtless, better informed than we can be. 



The President accepted the mediation of Russia from a respect 

 for the character of the Emperor, and a belief that our cause, in all 

 the points in controversy, would gain strength by being made known 

 to him. On the same principle he preferred (in accepting the British 

 overture to treat independently of the Russian mediation) to open the 

 negotiation on the continent rather than at London. 



It was inferred from the general policy of Russia, and the friendly 

 sentiments and interposition of the Emperor, that a respect for both 

 would have much influence with the British cabinet in promoting a 

 pacific policy towards us. The manner, however, in which it is under- 

 stood that a general pacification is taking place: the influence Great 

 Britain may have in modifying the arrangements involved in it: the 



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