260 CORRESPONDENCE, ETC., PRTOR TO TREATY OF 1818 



known, from day to day. to the British ministry. From neither of 

 them did we, in any shape, receive any intimation of their intentions, 

 of the general prospect of Europe, or of the interest they took in onr 

 contest with Great Britain. I have some reason to believe that all 

 of them were desirous that it might continue. They did not intend 

 to assist us; they appeared indifferent about our difficulties; but they 

 rejoiced at any thing which might occupy, and eventually weaken, 

 our enemy. The manner in which the campaign has terminated; the 

 evidence afforded, by its events, of our ability to resist, alone, the now 

 very formidable military power of England; and our having been 

 able, without, any foreign assistance, and after she had made such 

 an effort, to obtain peace on equal terms, will raise our character and 

 consequence in Europe. This, joined with the naval victories, and 

 the belief that we alone can fight the English on their element, will 

 make us to be courted as much as we have been neglected by foreign 

 Governments. As to the people of Europe, public opinion was 

 already most decidedly in our favor. I anticipate a settlement with 

 Spain on our own terms, and the immediate chastisement of the 

 Algerines. Permit me to suggest the propriety of despatching a 

 squadron for that purpose, without losing a single moment. 



I have little to add to our public despatch on the subject of the 

 terms of the treaty. I really think that there is nothing but nominal 

 in the Indian article, as adopted. With respect to precedent, you 



will find two, though neither is altogether in point, viz. the 



article of the treaty of Utrecht, and the latter part of the ■ 



article of our treaty with Spain. You know that there was no alter- 

 native between breaking off the negotiations and accepting the article; 

 and that we accepted it only as provisional, and subject to your 

 approbation or rejection. 



The exception of Moose island from the general restoration of terri- 

 tory is the only point on which it is possible that we might have 

 obtained an alteration, if we had adhered to our opposition to it. 

 The British Government had long fluctuated on the question of peace: 

 a favorable account from Vienna, the report of some success in the 

 Gulf of Mexico, or any other incident, might produce a change in 

 their disposition ; they had already, after the question had been refer- 

 red to them, declared that they could not consent to a relinquishment 

 of that point. We thought it too hazardous to risk the peace on the 

 question of the temporary possession of that small island, since the 

 question of title was fully reserved; and it was, therefore, no cession 

 of territory. 



On the subject of the fisheries within the jurisdiction of Great 

 Britain, Ave have certainly done all that could be done. If, according 

 to the construction of the treaty of 1783, which Ave assumed, the right 

 was not abrogated by the war, it remains entire, since we most ex- 

 plicitly refused to renounce it, either directly or indirectly. In that 

 case, it is only an unsettled subject of difference between the two 

 countries. If the right must be considered as abrogated by the Avar, 

 Ave cannot regain it without an equivalent. We had none to give 

 but the recognition of their right to naA'igate the Mississippi, and we 

 offered it. On this last supposition, this right is also lost to them; 

 and, in a general point of view, we ha\ T e certainly lost nothing. But 

 Ave have done all that was practicable in support of the right to 

 those fisheries; first, by the ground we assumed, respecting the con- 



