DESPATCHES, REPORTS, CORRESPONDENCE, ETC. 125 



peace, are without operation ? On this point, the undersigned would 

 refer Lord Castlereagh to the tenth article of the treaty of 1794 be- 

 tween the United States and Great Britain, where it is thus stipu- 

 lated : " Neither the debts due from individuals of the one nation to 

 the individuals of the other, nor shares, nor moneys, which they may 

 have in the public funds, or in the public or private banks, shall 

 ever, in any event of war, or national differences, be sequestered or 

 confiscated." If war puts an end to all treaties, what could the 

 parties to this engagement intend by making it formally an article 

 of the treaty? According to the principle laid down, excluding all 

 exception, by Lord Bathurst's note, the moment a war broke out be- 

 tween the two countries this stipulation became a dead letter, and 

 either State might have sequestered or confiscated those specified 

 properties, without any violation of compact between the nations. 



The undersigned believes that there are many exceptions to the rule 

 by which the treaties between nations are mutually considered as 

 terminated by the intervention of a war; that these exceptions extend 

 to all engagements contracted with the understanding that they are 

 to operate equally in war and peace, or exclusively during war; to 

 all engagements by which the parties superadd the sanction of a 

 formal compact to principles dictated by the eternal laws of morality 

 and humanity; and, finally, to all engagements which, according to 

 the expressions of Lord Bathurst's note, are in the nature of perpetual 

 obligation. To the first and second of these classes may be referred 

 the tenth article of the treaty of 1794, and all treaties or articles of 

 treaties stipulating the abolition of the slave trade. The treaty of 

 peace of 1783 belongs to the third. 



The reasoning of Lord Bathurst's note seems to confine this per- 

 petuity of obligation to recognitions and acknowledgments of title, 

 and to consider its perpetual nature as resulting from the subject- 

 matter of the contract, and not from the engagement of the con- 

 tractor. While Great Britain leaves the United States unmolested 

 in the enjoyment of all the advantages, rights, and liberties stipulated 

 in their behalf in the treaty of 1783, it is immaterial to them whether 

 she founds her conduct upon the mere fact that the United States 

 are in possession of such rights, or whether she is governed by good 

 faith and respect for her own engagements. But if she contests any 

 one of them, it is to her engagements only that the United States can 

 appeal as the rule for settling the question of right. If this appeal 

 be rejected, it ceases to be a discussion of right; and this observation 

 applies as strongly to the recognition of independence, and to the 

 boundary line in the treaty of 1783, as to the fisheries. It is truly 

 observed by Lord Bathurst, that in that treaty the independence of 

 the United States was not granted, but acknowledged. He adds, 

 that it might have been acknowledged without any treaty, and that 

 the acknowledgment, in whatever mode made, would have been irre- 

 vocable. But the independence of the United States was precisely 

 the question upon which a previous war between them and Great 

 Britain had been waged. Other nations might acknowledge their 

 independence without a treaty, because they had no right, or claim 

 of right, to contest it; but this acknowledgment, to be binding upon 

 Great Britain, could have been made only by treaty, because it in- 

 cluded the dissolution of one social compact between the parties, 

 as well as the formation of another. Peace could exist between the 



