166 APPENDIX TO BKITISH CASE. 



to territorial rights, Great Britain herself had not heretofore consid- 

 ered them as abrogated by the mere fact of an intervening war. 

 Thus, Tobago, ceded by her to France by the treaty of 1783, taken 

 during the ensuing war, and restored by the treaty of Amiens, had 

 again been retaken by Great Britain during the last war. She was 

 in actual possession when the treaty of 1814 took place, and if the 

 treaties of 1783 and of Amiens were abrogated by the last war, the 

 cession of that island by France had become null, and a retrocession 

 was useless. Yet Great Britain did not reason in that manner, and 

 did not consider her right good without a formal cession from France, 

 which she accordingly obtained by the last treaty of Paris. Thus, 

 neither the treaty of 1763 generally, nor the cession of Canada to 

 Great Britain particularly, having been renewed by the treaty of 

 Amiens, if the treaty of 1763 was abrogated by subsequent wars she 

 now held C nada by right of possession only, and the original right 

 of France had revived. "We applied those principles to fisheries 

 which, independent of the special circumstances of our treaty of 

 peace of 1783, were always considered as partaking in their nature 

 of territorial rights. It is, however, true, although it was not quoted 

 against us, that it had been deemed necessary to renew in every sub- 

 sequent treaty the right of fishing on part of the coast of New- 

 foundland originally reserved to the French. Although our argu- 

 ments were not answered, it appeared to me that two considerations 

 operated strongly against the admission of our right. That right 

 of taking and drying fish in harbours within the exclusive jurisdic- 

 tion of Great Britain, particularly on coasts now inhabited, was 

 extremely obnoxious to her, and was considered as what the French 

 civilians call a servitude. And personal pride seems also to have 

 been deeply committed, not perhaps the less because the argument 

 had not been very ably conducted on their part. I am satisfied that 

 we could have obtained additional fishing-ground in exchange of 

 the words " forever." I am perfectly sensible of the motives which 

 induced Government to wish that the portion of fisheries preserved 

 should be secured against the contingency of a future war. But it 

 seems to me that no treaty stipulation can effectually provide for this. 

 The fate of the fisheries in that case will depend on the result of the 

 war. If they beat us (which God forbid), they will certainly try to 

 deprive us of our fisheries on their own coasts. If we beat them, we 

 will preserve them and probably acquire the country itself. 



Yet I will not conceal that this subject caused me more anxiety than 

 any other branch of the negotiations, and that, after having partici- 

 pated in the treaty of Ghent, it Avas a matter of regret to be obliged 

 to sign an agreement which left the United States in any respect in 

 a worse situation than before the w r ar. It is true that we might have 

 defeated the whole object by insisting that the words " not liable to 

 be impaired by any future war " should be inserted in the article. 

 But this course did not appear justifiable. It was impossible, after 

 a counter-projet formed on compromise had been once offered, that 

 the United States could by negotiations alone be reinstated in their 

 enjoyment of the fisheries to their full extent; and if a compromise 

 was to take place, the present time and the terms proposed appeared 

 more eligible than the chance of future contingencies. I became per- 

 fectly satisfied that no reliance could be placed on legal remedies; 



