280 APPENDIX TO BRITISH CASE. 



from my age, the most uncertain. But I shall not cease to raise my 

 voice when I believe danger approaches, unmindful of the senseless 

 charge so often made against me, that, because I am jealous of the 

 honour and rights of my own country, I am therefore hostile to all 

 others. I shall defend myself against no such clamour. 



Mr. Davis, of Massachusetts. 



Mr. Davis said: I propose to occupy only a brief period of the 

 time of the Senate in the discussion of this question. I said, the 

 other day, when this subject was under the consideration of the 

 Senate, that I felt no peculiar degree of alarm ; that I did not appre- 

 hend that hostilities would grow out of it ; and that opinion remains 

 unchanged. Nevertheless, I see much to object to in the course 

 pursued by Great Britain. I see much that is irritating in its char- 

 acter, and well calculated to ripen a feeling of hostility. 



But, before touching on the subject really under consideration, I 

 wish to make one remark in regard to a topic connected with it the 

 proposition which comes from the Colonies for reciprocity of trade. 

 It has been suggested by the Senator from Michigan, to whose 

 patriotic sentiments I have listened with great pleasure, that the 

 question as to the privileges of reciprocal free trade, might form a 

 subject of negotiation between the two countries; but here, at the 

 outset, I enter my protest against any such proceedings, so far as 

 revenue is concerned, at any time, and under any circumstances which 

 may exist. Is the Congress of the United States prepared to transfer 

 the control of the revenues of the country to the treaty-making 

 power? Are we prepared to transfer it to negotiators, and let them 

 settle and determine what amount of revenue we are, from time to 

 time, to raise for the uses of this country? A treaty is an irrevocable 

 law ; it is a law which cannot be modified at any time or under any 

 circumstances, except by agreement of the Contracting Parties. In 

 one year we may require 40,000,000 to meet the exigencies of the 

 public service, and in the next year, we may want 80,000,000, in the 

 transition state of our affairs which may exist from causes which 

 cannot be anticipated. No man in his sober senses can suppose that 

 the control of the revenue should be transferred to the treaty-making 

 power. It would be an encroachment on the fundamental principle 

 of the constitution itself. So jealous is that constitution of the 

 money power of the country, that it does not even allow this body, 

 in its legislative capacity, to originate a money bill. 



Such, Sir, were the feelings and views of those who framed that 

 instrument, and of the people who adopted it. And now, Sir, at this 

 day, it seems to me the opinion can hardly be entertained anywhere, 

 and under any circumstances, that the revenues of the country are to 

 be transferred to, and disposed of, by the treaty-making power. But, 

 Sir, I will not trouble you on that point. I only wish to say, that 

 whenever such a treaty comes here, it will never meet with my appro- 

 bation. 



As to these fisheries, in regard to which negotiation is appropriate, 

 I think this whole matter is to be explained as a stroke of policy. It 

 may be a dangerous step to be taken by the British Government, and 



