564 APPENDIX TO BRITISH CASE. 



the report of the Minister of Marine and Fisheries, approved on the 

 14th June ultimo. 



While believing, however, that Mr. Phelps cannot, by resort to 

 any such matters, successfully establish a different construction for 

 the Treaty from that which its words present, the undersigned sub- 

 mits that Mr. Phelps is mistaken as to the right to resort to any mat- 

 ters outside the Treaty itself to modify its plain words. Mr. Phelps 

 expresses his contention thus : " It seems to me clear that the Treaty 

 may be considered in accordance with those ordinary and well settled 

 rules, applicable to all written instruments, which, without such 

 salutary assistance, must constantly fail of their purpose. By these 

 rules the letter often gives way to the intent, or rather is only used 

 to ascertain the intent, and the whole document will be taken together, 

 and will be considered in connection with the attending circum- 

 stances, the situation of the parties and the object in view, and thus 

 the literal meaning of an isolated clause is often shown not to be the 

 meaning really understood or intended." It may be readily admitted 

 that such rules of interpretation exist, but when are they to be ap- 

 plied? Only when "interpretation" is necessary. When the words 

 are plain in their ordinary meaning, the task of interpretation does 

 not begin, Vattel says in reference to the " Interpretation of Treaties": 



The first general maxini of interpretation is that, it is not alloicaUe to 

 interpret ichat has no need of interpretation. When the deed is worded in 

 clear and precise terms, when its meaning is evident, and leads to no absurd 

 conclusion, there can be no reason for refusing to admit the meaning which 

 such deed naturally presents. To go elsewhere in search of conjectures, in 

 order to restrict or extend it, is but an attempt to elude it. 



Those cavillers who dispute the sense of a clear and determinate 

 article, are accustomed to seek their frivolous subterfuges in the pre- 

 tended intentions and views which they attribute to its author. It 

 would be very often dangerous to enter with them into the discussion 

 of those supposed views that are pointed out in the piece itself. The 

 following rule is better calculated to foil such cavillers and will at 

 once cut short all chicanery. // he who could, and ought to have 

 explained himself clearly and fully, has not done it, it is the worse 

 for him; he cannot be allowed to introduce subsequent restrictions 

 which he has not expressed. This [is] a maxim of the Roman Law: 

 Pactionem obscuram Us nocere in quorum fuit potestate legem 

 337 apertius conscribere. The equity of this rule is glaringly ob- 

 vious and its necessity is -not less evident." (Vattel's " In- 

 terpretation of Treaties" Liv. II, cap. 17.) 



Sedgewich, the American writer, on the " Construction of Stat- 

 utes," (and treaties are constructed [construed] by much the same 

 rules as statutes), says, at page 194: 



The rule is, as we shall constantly see, cardinal and universal, that if the 

 statute is plain and unambiguous, there is no room for construction or inter- 

 pretation. The Legislature has spoken, their intention is free from doubt, and 

 their will must be obeyed. " It may be proper," it has been said in Kentucky, 

 in giving a construction to a statute, -to look to the effects and consequences, 

 when its provisions are ambiguous, or the legislative intention is doubtful. 

 But when the law is clear and explicit, and its provisions are susceptible of 

 but one interpretation, its consequences, if evil, can only be avoided by a 

 change of the law itself, to be effected by legislative and not judicial action. 

 So too it is said by the Supreme Court of the United States, where a law 



