DESPATCHES, REPORTS, CORRESPONDENCE, ETC. 5G5 



is plain and unambiguous, whether it be expressed in general or limited terms, 

 the Legislature should be intended to mean what they have plainly expressed, 

 and consequently no room is left for construction. 



At the tribunal of arbitration at Geneva, held under the Wash- 

 ington Treaty in 1872, a similar question arose. Counsel for Her 

 Majesty's Government presented a supplemental argument in which 

 the ordinary rules for the interpretation of treaties were invoked. 

 Mr. Evarts, one of the Counsel for the United States, and afterwards 

 Secretary of State, made a supplemental reply, in which the follow- 

 ing passage occurs : 



At the close of the special argument we find a general presentation of canons 

 for the construction of treaties, and some general observations as to the light, 

 or the controlling reason, under which these rules of the Treaty should be 

 construed. These suggestions may be briefly dismissed. It certainly would be 

 t\ very great reproach to these nations, which had deliberately fixed upon three 

 propositions, as expressive of the law of nations in their judgment for the 

 purposes of this trial, that a resort to general instructions, for the purpose of 

 interpretation, was necessary. Eleven canons of interpretation drawn from 

 Vattel are presented in order, and then several of them, as the case suits, are 

 applied as valuable in elucidating this or that point of the rules. But the 

 learned Counsel has omitted to bring to your notice the first and most general 

 rule of Vattel, which being once understood, would, as .we think, dispense with 

 any consideration of the subordinate canons, which Vattel has introduced, 

 to be used only in case his first general rule does not apply. This first propo- 

 sition is that it is not alloivablc to interpret what has no need of interpre- 

 tation. (Washington Treaty Papers, vol. III. pp. 446-7.) 



In a letter of Mr. Hamilton Fish to the United States' Minister 

 in England, on the same subject, dated 16th April, 1872, the follow- 

 ing view was set forth : 



Further than this it appears to me that the principles of English and 

 American law (and they are substantially the same) regarding the construc- 

 tion of statutes and treaties and of written instruments generally, would 

 preclude the seeking of evidence of interest [intent] outside the instrument 

 itself. It might be a painful trial on which to enter, in seeking the opinions 

 and recollections of parties to bring into conflict the differing expectations 

 of those who were engaged in the negotiation of an instrument. (Washington 

 Treaty Papers, vol. II., page 473.) 



But even at this barrier, the difficulty in following Mr. Phelps' 

 argument, by which he seeks to reach the interpretation he desires, 

 does not end after taking a view of the treaty which all authorities 

 thus forbid. He says : " Thus regarded, it appears to me clear that 

 the words ' for no other purpose whatever,' as employed in the treaty, 

 mean ' for no other purpose inconsistent with the provisions of the 

 Treaty.' " 



Taken in that sense the words would leave no meaning, for no 

 other purpose would be consistent with the Treaty, excepting those 

 mentioned. 



He proceeds. " or prejudicial to the interests of the provinces or 

 their inhabitants." If the United States' authorities are the judges 

 as to what is prejudicial to those interests, the Treaty will have very 

 little value. If the provinces are to be the judges, it is most preju- 

 dicial to their interests that United States' fishermen should be per- 

 mitted to come into their harbours on any pretext, and it is fatal to 

 their fishery interests that those fishermen, with whom they have to 

 compete at such a disadvantage in the markets of the United States. 

 should be allowed to enter for supplies and bait, even for -the pursuit 



