594 APPENDIX TO BRITISH CASE. 



Terror." He was, as the term "Canadian cruiser" used by him 

 enables us to conclude, not an officer in His Majesty's distinctive 

 service. He was not the commander of a revenue cutter, for the 

 head of the customs' service disavowed him. Yet he was arresting 

 and boarding in defiance of law, a vessel there seeking shelter, over- 

 influencing the collector of the port into the imposition of a fine, 

 hauling down with his own hand the flag of the United States, which 

 was displayed over the vessel, and enforcing arbitrarily an additional 

 period of detention after the deposit had been made, simply because 

 the captain of the vessel refused to obey him by executing an order 

 insulting to the flag which the vessel bore. If armed cruisers art- 

 employed in seizing, harassing, and humiliating storm-bound vessels 

 of the United States on Canadian coasts, breaking up their voyages 

 and mulcting them with fines and costs, it is important for reasons 

 presently to be specified that this Government should be advised of 

 the fact. 



From Her Majesty's Government redress is asked. And that 

 redress, as I shall have occasion to say hereafter, is not merely the 

 indemnification of the parties suffering by Captain Quigley's actions, 

 but his withdrawal from the waters where the outrages I represent 

 to you have been committed. 



I have already said that the claims thus presented could be abun- 

 dantly sustained by the law of nations, aside from treaty and other 

 rights. But I am not willing to rest the case on the law of nations. 

 It is essential that the issue between United States' fishing vessels 

 and the "cruiser Terror" should be examined in all its bearings, 

 and settled in regard not merely to the general law of nations, but 

 to the particular rights of the parties aggrieved. 



It is a fact that the fishing vessel Marion Grimes had as much 

 right under the special relations of Great Britain and the United 

 States, to enter the harbor of Shelburne, as had the Canadian cruiser. 

 The fact that the Grimes was liable to penalties for the abuse of 

 such right of entrance does not disprove its existence. Captain 

 Quigley is certainly liable to penalties for his misconduct on the 

 occasion referred to. Captain Landry was not guilty of misconduct 

 in entering and seeking to leave that harbor, and had abused no 

 privilege. But whether liable or no for subsequent abuse of the 

 rights, I maintain that the right of free entrance into that port, to 

 obtain shelter, and whatever is incident thereto, belonged as much 



to the American fishing vessel as to the Canadian cruiser. 

 355 The basis of this right is thus declared by an eminent jurist 

 and statesman, Mr. R. R. Livingston, the first Secretary of 

 State appointed by the Continental Congress, in instructions issued 

 on January 7, 1782, to Dr. Franklin, then at Paris, entrusted by the 

 United States with the negotiation of articles of peace with GJreat 

 Britain : 



The arguments on which the people of America found their claim to fish on 

 the banks of Newfoundland arise, first, from their having once formed a part 

 of the British Empire, in which state they always enjoyed as fully as the 

 people of Britain themselves the right of fishing on those Banks. They have 

 shared in all the wars for the extension of that right, and Britain could with 

 no more Justice have excluded them from the enjoyment of it (even supposing 

 that one nation could possess it to the exclusion of another) while they formed 

 a part of that empire than they could exclude the people of London or Bristol. 

 If so, the only inquiry is, how have we lost this right. If we were tenants in 



