DESPATCHES, REPORTS, CORRESPONDENCE, ETC. 785 



The President has succeeded in making provision for a settlement 

 of these long-standing disputes on terms that are just and reason- 

 able, as we are satisfied a much better settlement than has been 

 even attempted heretofore, and one that will increase, in the future, 

 the liberality of commerce with Canada. 



If the Senate shall decline to ratify this treaty there will remain 

 no doubt that it assumes all the responsibility for what may here- 

 after result from the proper employment by the President of the 

 retaliatory powers that Congress has conferred upon him. 



If the proper use of those powers is considered by Great Britain 

 as a violation of the treaty of 1818, in demanding for our fishermen 

 greater liberties and privileges than that treaty secured to them, and 

 that we are enforcing that demand through commercial duress, the 

 Senate will also take whatever responsibility m&y belong to that 

 situation. 



Congress declined to say in the act of March 3, 1887, that the 

 rights of American fishermen had been denied or abridged, but left 

 it to the President to determine that question. If this treaty is 

 rejected, it is beyond dispute that retaliation is the only means, short 

 of war, by which we can redress our wrongs, if we have suffered any. 



The Senate, in rejecting this treaty, will affirm that such wrongs 

 exist, which Congress did not so assert, and, because thereof, will 

 force the President to proclaim non-intercourse. 



VII. THE PROTOCOL TO THE TREATY IS AN HONORABLE AND FRIENDLY 

 OVERTURE OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT, AND SHOULD BE ALLOWED 

 TO DEVELOP, BY ACTUAL EXPERIENCE, WHETHER THIS TREATY WILL 

 BE BENEFICIAL TO OUR FISHERIES AND COMMERCE. 



In view of a possible disagreement between the Senate and Presi- 

 dent as to the value of this treaty to our fishermen, the undersigned 

 respectfully call the attention of the Senate to the importance of 

 postponing its consideration until the next December session of 

 Congress. 



The protocol to the treaty, suggested and offered by the British 

 plenipotentiaries, tenders to our fishermen very liberal commercial 

 privileges in Canadian ports for two years. 



This overture is equivalent, almost, to a guaranty that during this 

 period the British Government, in conjunction with the provincial 

 governments, will prevent the recurrence of the interferences with 

 our fishermen that have given them such serious disquietude. It 

 will also put into practice, substantially, all the provisions of the 

 present treaty, except those relating to the delimitation of fishing 

 boundaries. 



A single fishing season, under such conditions, will demonstrate that 

 this treaty is a failure, or else that it is of great value to the country. 



The advantage of such experience is manifest, and we should not 

 rashly trust to our opinions, which must be largely conjectural, when 

 we can fortify them or disprove their soundness by a shore delay in 

 our action, which does not commit us, in the least degree, either for 

 or against the treaty. 



The British Government has exerted a restraining influence dur- 

 ing the whole period since 1818 over the provincial governments as 

 to their demands and proceedings under that treaty. That Govern- 

 92909 S. Doc. 870, 61-3, vol 4 60 



