786 APPENDIX TO BEITISH CASE. 



ment has encouraged liberality in the conduct of the fishermen and 

 in commercial interchange between the United States and the prov- 

 inces ; seeing that the prosperity of those countries greatly depended 

 on such a policy. 



It has not been an easy task to restrain the people of the provinces 

 to a course of moderation. Political reasons, not always favorable 

 to the Crown, and the jealousies of rival interests in fishing rights 

 held in common by the people of two countries, and even the linger- 

 ing hatreds engendered by our Revolutionary war, have been active 

 in promoting discord in these colonies. Great Britain never before 

 had so capital an interest in fostering the loyalty of the Canadians. 

 The Suez Canal is scarcely more important to the interests of that 

 Empire than the Can'adian Pacific Railway. 



But other interests of the most important character inspire the 

 British Government with an earnest purpose to cultivate the closest 

 friendship with the people of Canada. 



It is evidently the true policy of the British Government to 

 472 satisfy the people of these provinces that the treaty now be- 

 fore the Senate will be of advantage to them, because of the 

 additional liberty of commerce that it extends to our fishermen; and 

 this was doubtless a strong inducement to that Government to offer 

 voluntarily to us the privileges stated in the protocol to the treaty. 



We have almost as great an interest in affording to our people the 

 opportunity of a practical test of the advantage of these privileges 

 offered in this protocol. 



In matters of such moment we can not justify a rejection of such a 

 proposition, not requiring our formal acceptance to make it available, 

 on the ground that we could not, without dishonor, permit such a 

 course, resulting in such possible advantages to us, even for one fishing 

 season, and then reject the treaty. 



We have not in any way invited or suggested this offer of the 

 British Government, and we are not asked to accept it. It proposes, 

 for a time, to liberalize the commercial privileges of our fishermen in 

 the provincial ports, for reasons satisfactory to the British Gov- 

 ernment. 



If we should hasten our action on this treaty with the purpose of 

 preventing an effort of that Government to satisfy Her Majesty's 

 subjects that a liberal policy towards us is the best, or even of con- 

 vincing our people by experience that such a policy is also best for 

 us, we would incur greater discredit by such action than could pos- 

 sibly attend our rejection of the treaty, after a fair trial of the British 

 expedient presented in this protocol had satisfied our people that the 

 treaty should not be ratified. 



VIII. THE HEADLAND THEORY, AS APPLICABLE TO THE BAYS, HARBORS, 



AND CREEKS THAT ARE CLAIMED AS TERRITORIAL WATERS, HAS NOT BEEN 

 ABANDONED BY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT, EXCEPT IN THIS TREATY. IT 

 WAS A VITAL QUESTION WHEN THIS NEGOTIATION WAS ENTERED UPON. 



It is insisted by some that Great Britain had abandoned the head- 

 land theory, and that it was obsolete when this treaty was made. 



The undersigned do not understand that the British headland 

 theory, as applied to the bays, harbors, and creeks that had geo- 

 graphical names and limits, and were included by British or pro- 



