802 APPENDIX TO BRITISH CASE. 



It was also proved before the committee that, with the rarest excep- 

 tions, it would l>e absolutely injurious to the pecuniary interests of 

 all concerned for American vessels to resort to Dominion ports or 

 waters, except in need or distress, for the time taken in such de- 

 partures from the cod and halibut grounds, or from direct sailing to 

 and from them, is so great that, with or without the difference of port 

 expenses, time and money are both lost in such visits. 



In respect of the mackerel fishery the committee finds, as will be 

 seen from the evidence referred to, that its course and methods have 

 of late years entirely changed. While it used to be carried on by 

 vessels fishing with hook and line, and sometimes near the shores, it 

 is now almost entirely carried on by the use of immense seines, 

 called purse-seines, of great length and descending many fathoms 

 into the water. This gear is very expensive, and a fishing vessel does 

 not usually carry more than one or two. The danger of fishing near 

 the shore with such seines is so great, on account of striking rocks 

 and reefs, that it is regarded as extremely hazardous ever to under- 

 take it. Besides this, the large schools of mackerel, to the taking of 

 which this great apparatus is best adapted, are almost always found 

 more than 3 miles from land, either in great bays and gulfs or 

 entirely out at sea. 



There will be found accompanying this report (see Appendix) 

 statements showing the total catch of mackerel during certain years 

 and the parts of the seas where they have been taken ; and it will also 

 be seen from the evidence that in general the mackerel fisheries by 

 Americans in the Gulf of St. Lawrence and in the Bay of Chaleur 

 have not been remunerative. 



In view of these facts, well known to the great body of the citi- 

 zens of the United States engaged in fisheries and embracing every 

 variety of interest connected therewith, from the wholesale dealer, 

 vessel owner, and outfitter, to that portion of the crew who receive 

 the smallest share of the venture, it must be considered as con- 

 clusively established that there would be no material value whatever 

 in the grant by the British Government to American fishermen of 

 absolutely free fishing ; and in this conclusion it will be seen, by a 

 reference to the testimony, that all these interests fully concur. 



When we consider that the inshore fisheries are of no value and 

 that the right to take bait, or to buy it, is worse than useless to our 

 people, the alleged surrender of fishing territory to the British in 

 this treaty is of far less consequence to us than the surrender we 

 made in 1854, to get these privileges, by purchasing with reciprocity 

 the repose of the British contentions, restrictions, and exclusions, at 

 a cost to our revenues of nearly $10,000,000; and in 1871, by a pur- 

 chase with $5,500,000 in money, and a great sum in the loss of 

 revenues on fish imported from Canada. 



We have paid for everything we have got from Great Britain, 

 since 1783, in connection with the fisheries. That concession was the 

 last thing we got under our strict demand for the right. It is the 

 last thing we will ever get, without compensation, until we go to 

 war to regain our attitude of 1783. 



The extract from the report of the Senate committee, above copied, 

 shows that in such a war we would be fighting over a subject 

 483 that is utterly barren of any actual value to the American peo- 

 ple a war in which the principles involved would have no 



