DESPATCHES, REPORTS, CORRESPONDENCE, ETC. 809 



Upon these vexed questions it is not at all necessary to enter in the 

 present case, for they have little to do with it. Whether the con- 

 clusions of one or the other of these conflicting opinions are to be 

 accepted, is immaterial here. All authorities agree that the sole 

 reason upon which a certain right of jurisdiction upon the sea, and 

 within a limit that is variously stated, has been conceded to Maritime 

 nations, is found in the necessities of self-defence. This part of the 

 Dominion over the sea, whether it be greater or less, has never been 

 surrendered. It is a remnant of the former more extended dominion, 

 retained for the same reason for which that was asserted. Lord 

 Chief Justice Cockburn, in his opinion in the case just cited, reviews 

 the history of this subject, quoting the language of every previous 

 writer of repute, and referring to every judicial decision respecting 

 it which then existed. He points out very clearly the different views 

 that have prevailed and which then prevailed as to the nature of the 

 jurisdiction, and as to the distance over which it could be extended. 

 This limit has been variously asserted by writers of distinction and 

 authority, at two days' sail, one hundred miles, sixty miles, the 

 horizon line, as far as can be seen from the shore, as far as bottom 

 can be found with the dead line, the range of a cannon shot, two 

 leagues, one league, or so far as the Government might think 

 necessary. 



On the other point, the character of the jurisdiction, it may be 

 assumed that by the controlling opinion of the present time, and by 

 the usage of nations, it is not regarded as so far absolute that a 

 nation may exclude altogether from within the range of cannon shot 

 the ships of another country, innocently navigating, and violating 

 no reasonable regulation of the municipal law. But the power which 

 may be exerted within that limit is only coextensive with the just 

 requirements of the self-protection for which it exists, although un- 

 doubtedly the nation exercising the jurisdiction must be allowed, so 

 long as it acts in good faith, to be its own judge as to the regulations 

 proper to be prescribed, and the manner of their enforcement. 



This somewhat indefinite area of a greater or less jurisdiction over 

 the marginal sea, which has thus come to be recognized and conceded, 

 though accorded for the purposes of national self-protection, is by no 

 means its boundary. It illustrates the right of which it is an ex- 

 ample, but does not exhaust it. It is but one application of the 

 principle out of many. The necessity which gave rise to it justifies 

 likewise the larger power, and further means of defence, 

 487 which may from time to time be required. No nation, in 

 whatever Statute or Treaty k may have assented to the three- 

 mile or cannon-shot limit of municipal jurisdiction, has ever agreed 

 to surrender its right of self defence outside of that boundary, or to 

 substitute for that right the contracted and qualified power which 

 is only one of the results of it, and which must often prove inade- 

 quate or inapplicable. On the contrary, as will be seen hereafter, 

 many nations have been compelled to assert, and have successfully 

 asserted, much wider and larger powers in the defence of their 

 manifold interests. 



It is under the operation of the same principle on which jurisdic- 

 tion is awarded to nations over the sea within the 3-mile or cannon- 

 shot limit, that a similar jurisdiction is allowed to be exercised not 

 only over navigable rivers, bays, and estuaries, which may be fairly 



