620 MISCELLANEOUS 



Thus, Tobago, ceded by her to France by the treaty of 1783, taken 

 during the ensuing war, and restored by the treaty of Amiens, had 

 again been retaken by Great Britain during the last war. She was 

 in actual possession when the treaty of 1814 took place, and if the 

 treaties of 1783 and of Amiens were abrogated by the last war, the 

 cession of that island by France had become null, and a retrocession 

 was useless. Yet Great Britain did not reason in that manner, and 

 did not consider her right good without a formal cession from France, 

 which she accordingly obtained by the last Treaty of Paris. Thus, 

 neither the treaty of 1763 generally, nor the cession of Canada to 

 Great Britain particularly, having been renewed by the Treaty of 

 Amiens, if the treaty of 1763 was abrogated by subsequent wars she 

 now held, Canada by right of possession only, and the original right 

 of France had revived. We applied those principles to fisheries 

 which, independent of the special circumstances of our treaty of 

 peace of 1783, were always considered as partaking in their nature of 

 territorial rights. It is, however, true, although it was not quoted 

 against us, that it had been deemed necessary to renew in every sub- 

 sequent treaty the right of fishing on part of the coast of Newfound- 

 land originally reserved to the French. Although our arguments 

 were not answered, it appeared to me that two considerations operated 

 strongly against the admission of our right. That right of taking and 

 drying fish in harbors within the exclusive jurisdiction of Great 

 Britain, particularly on coasts now inhabited, was extremely obnox- 

 ious to her, and was considered as what the French civilians call a 

 servitude. And personal pride seems also to have been deeply com- 

 mitted, not perhaps the less because the argument had not been very 

 ably conducted on their part. I am satisfied that we could have 

 obtained additional fishing ground in exchange of the words " for- 

 ever." I am perfectly sensible of the motives which induced gov- 

 ernment to wish that the portion of fisheries preserved should be 

 secured against the contingency of a future war. But it seems to me 

 that no treaty stipulation can effectually provide for this. The fate 

 of the fisheries in that case will depend on the result of the war. If 

 they beat us (which God forbid), they will certainly try to deprive us 

 of our fisheries on their own coasts. If we beat them, we will preserve 

 them and probably acquire the country itself. 



Yet I will not conceal that this subject caused me more anxiety 

 than any other branch of the negotiations, and that, after having 

 participated in the Treaty of Ghent, it was a matter of regret to 

 be obliged to sign an agreement which left the United States in any 

 respect in a worse situation than before the war. It is true that 

 we might have defeated the whole object by insisting that the words 

 u not liable to be impaired by any future war " should be inserted 

 in the article. But this course did not appear justifiable. It was 

 impossible, after a counter-project formed on compromise had been 

 once offered, that the United States could by negotiations alone be 

 reinstated in their enjoyment of the fisheries to their full extent; 

 and if a compromise was to take place, the present time and the 

 terms proposed appeared more eligible than the chance of future con- 

 tingencies. I became perfectly satisfied that no reliance could be 

 placed on legal remedies; that no court in England would give to 

 the treaty of 1783 a construction different from that adopted by their 



