50 APPENDIX TO BRITISH COUNTER CASE. 



we may presume either that they doubt our success or do not much 

 interest themselves in it. 



Our expectations from Spain are scarcely more flattering. Some 

 little aids of money have been received after long solicitation ; hardly 

 so much as paid the expense of soliciting. We have reason to suppose 

 that no more will be granted. They are still cold with regard to our 

 alliance; nothing but brilliant success can bring it to a conclusion. 

 Nor have we the smallest reason to expect any pecuniary aid from 

 her, even if she should confederate with us in time to be of use for the 

 next campaign. She has at this moment very many and very expen- 

 sive operations on hand ; and. till she has allied herself to us, we have 

 no certainty that she will choose to continue the Avar for the attain- 

 ment of our independence, if Britain should be sufficiently humbled 

 'to sacrifice to her the objects which led her into the war. 



To France then we turn as the only enemy of Great Britain. Avho 

 is at the same time our ally, who will persevere in the war for the 

 attainment of our independence. She has already done so much for 

 us in order to afford us the means of doing something for ourselves 

 that she may reasonably hope to find the effects of her benevolence. 

 Her fleets have protected our coasts, her armies have fought our but- 

 tles; she has made various efforts to restore our finances by paying 

 the interest of our loans, by obtaining credit in Europe on our ac- 

 count for clothing, arms, and necessaries, by advancing money and by 

 opening and guaranteeing a loan for us to a considerable amount in 

 Holland, when by the abolition of paper our finances were totally 

 deranged. These sums are nearly expended, and another campaign 

 is about to be opened. France assures us that it is not in her power 

 to make us any further grants of money. Her Ministers repeat this 

 to us in every letter in a tone that persuades us of their determination 

 on that point. 



What, then, is to be done? Are we to relinquish the hopes which 

 the present debility of the enemy affords us of expelling them by one 

 decided effort, and compensating all our losses by the enjoyment of 

 an active commerce? Are we to return to the wretched, oppressive 

 system we have quitted? Are we to carry on a weak and defensive 

 war with an unpaid army, whose precarious subsistence must depend 

 upon what can be torn by violence from the industrious husbandman ? 

 Shall we vainly, and I think disgracefully, supplicate all the powers 

 of Europe for those means which we have in our own hands if we 

 dare call them forth, and which after all must be called forth if 

 we continue the war (and upon that subject there can be no doubt 

 till the end for which we took up arms is attained). The only ques- 

 tion is whether each State shall fairly and regularly contribute its 

 quota, or whether that which happens to be the seat of war shall (as 

 has too often been the case) bear the whole burden, and suffer more 

 from the necessities of our own troops than the ravages of the enemy. 

 Whether we shall drive the enemy from their posts with a strong 

 body of regular troops or whether we shall permit them to extend 

 their devastations, while with our battalions and fluctuating corps 

 of militia we protract a weak defensive war till our allies are dis- 

 couraged and some unfavorable change takes place in the system of 

 Europe. 



Your excellency, I am persuaded, will pardon the freedom with 

 which I write. You see the necessity which dictates my letter, and 



