DOCUMENTS BEARING ON TREATY OF 1783. 153 



Having, after much consideration, become persuaded that these 

 were M. Kayneval's objects, I mentioned his journey to Mr. Oswald, 

 and after stating to him the first three of theee objects, I said every- 

 thing respecting them that appeared to me necessary, but at the 

 same time with a greater degree of caution than I could have wished, 

 because I well knew it would become the subject of a long letter 

 to the ministry. On reflecting, however, how necessary it was that 

 Lord Shelburne should know our sentiments and resolutions respect- 

 ing these matters, and how much better they could be combed in 

 conversation than by letter, and knowing also that Mr. Vaughan 

 was in confidential correspondence with him, and he was and always 

 had been strongly attached to the American cause, I concluded it 

 would be prudent to prevail upon him to go immediately to England. 



I accordingly had an interview with Mr. Vaughan, and he imme- 

 diately despatched a few lines to Lord Shelburne, desiring that he 

 would delay taking any measures with M. Rayneval until he should 

 either see or hear further from him. 



Mr. Vaughan agreed to go to England, and we had much previous 

 conversation on the points in question, the substance of which was: 



That Britain, by a peace with us, certainly expected other ad- 

 vantages than a mere suspension of hostilities, and that she doubtless 

 looked forward to cordiality, confidence, and commerce. 



That the manner as- well as the matter of the proposed treaty was 

 therefore of importance, and that if the late assurances respecting our 

 independence were not realised by an unconditional acknowledgment, 

 neither confidence nor peace could reasonably be expected ; that this 

 measure was considered by America as the touchstone of British 

 sincerity, and that nothing could abate the suspicions and doubts of 

 her good faith which prevailed there. 



That the interest of Great Britain, as well as that of the Minister, 

 would be advanced by it; for as every idea of conquest had become 

 absurd, nothing remained for Britain to do but to make friends of 

 those whom she could not subdue; that the way to do this was by 

 leaving us nothing to complain of, either in the negociation or in the 

 treaty of peace, and by liberally yielding every point essential to the 

 interest and happiness of America; the first of which points was that 

 of treating with us on an equal footing. 



******* 



That it would not be wise in Great Britain to think of dividing 

 the fishery with France and excluding us ; because we could not make 

 peace at such an expense, and because such an attempt would irritate 

 America still more; would perpetuate her resentments, and induce 

 her to use every possible means of retaliation by withholding sup- 

 plies in future to the fishery, and by imposing the most rigid re- 

 straints on a commerce with Britain. 



That it would not be less impolitic to oppose us on the point of 

 boundary and the navigation of the Mississippi 



1st. Because our right to extend to the Mississippi was proved by 

 our charters and other acts of government and our right to its navi- 

 gation was deducible from the laws of nature and the consequences 

 of revolution, which vested in us every British territorial right. It 

 was easy, therefore, to foresee what opinions and sensations the mere 

 attempt to dispossess us of these rights would diffuse throughout 

 America. 



