ARGUMENT OF SIB JAMES WINTER. 957 



A clear, unqualified, plain distinction is drawn between Labrador 

 on the one side and the other localities or districts or areas or 

 573 whatever they may be called upon the other. There can be no 

 question as to what is the obvious meaning of the words, the 

 clear, plain, simple meaning of the words. But if there is a ques- 

 tion before this Tribunal, and it has been raised, it is whether the 

 plain and obvious meaning of the words is to be altered? Are the 

 words to be read in any sense differently from that in which they 

 appear in the treaty itself? 



It will, of course, have already been observed by the Tribunal, in 

 reading over the Case and Counter-Case and the Arguments in this 

 matter, as no doubt has" been done by the Court, that the contention 

 broadly the contention on the side of the United States is that the 

 word "coast" necessarily includes "bays, harbors and creeks." I 

 suppose it is their contention that it would include it anywhere, and 

 that it includes it here in this particular document, this particular 

 treaty that the word "coasts" includes the "bays, harbors and 

 creeks." Or, to put it in another way, that the intention of the 

 parties was to include " bays, harbors and creeks/' and that the words 

 " bays, harbors and creeks " must, as it is called, be read into the 

 treaty. They are not there now, but they must be read into the 

 treaty, and so the meaning contended for by the United States be 

 practically accomplished or given. 



Our contention is, to start with, that the question is, and the onus 

 is, upon the other side if I may use the familiar expression the 

 onus is upon those who set up the contention against the British con- 

 tention the onus is upon them to show that the word " coasts " was 

 intended to include "bays, harbors and creeks." 



Now, how that burden can be borne how that onus can be carried 

 and borne by the other side will depend of course upon many con- 

 siderations. But I may say this : that if it were a strict trial of the 

 question according to the strict practice and formula in a British 

 court or a court of the United States, I think, as far as I am a\vare 

 of the law of that country the principle would apply that the onus 

 would be upon the other side to show that the word " coast " included 

 " bays, harbors and creeks," or that " bays, harbors and creeks " ought 

 to be read into the treaty if they are not there already. The first 

 contention that would arise is that it is not competent to go outside 

 of the document itself. There are the words themselves. They are 

 capable of the meaning which we attribute to them. On the face of 

 them they themselves bear a plain and obvious meaning, and it is 

 not competent for a court that has to construe a document of that 

 sort to go outside of the face of the document itself. It is obvious 

 therefore on fche face of it, it is plain and clear that those who drew 

 that document presuming, of course, as a matter of law as well as a 

 matter of fact, in this case that they knew what they were doing 



