ARGUMENT OF CHARLES B. WARREN. 1081 



Jefferson, President of the United States, of the 8th September, 1804, 

 which was the sixth subdivision of the data now being considered, 

 will be taken up in connection with these notes from Mr. Jefferson 

 in 1T93. 



These three notes will be found in the Appendix to the British Case 

 on pp. 56, 57, and 59. These notes were much relied upon by the 

 distinguished counsel for Great Britain, Sir Robert Finlay. 



The Tribunal has read these notes, has heard them discussed 

 by counsel, and will recall that in the note on p. 56 of the British 

 Case Appendix, Mr. Jefferson stated that the jurisdiction of the 

 United States was confined to 3 geographical miles from the 

 651 shore. This statement appears about twelve lines from the 

 bottom of p. 56. That statement was not interesting to the 

 counsel for Great Britain as it was a plain statement limiting the 

 maritime jurisdiction of the United States to 3 geographical miles 

 from the shore. It was to the statement regarding rivers and bays 

 of the United States that the counsel gave especial attention, and that 

 clause reads : 



" For that of the rivers and bays of the United States, the laws of 

 the several States are understood to have made provision, and they 

 are, moreover, as being landlocked, within the body of the 'United 

 States." 



The note to Mr. Hammond, the British Minister in the United 

 States, set out on p. 57 of the British Case Appendix, may be called 

 practically a similar note, because, as Sir Robert Finlay said, it 

 differs in wording only slightly from the note to M. Genet. 



The third note which I am about to discuss appears on p. 59 of the 

 Appendix to the British Case, and is the note of Mr. Jefferson, when 

 President, to the Secretary of the Treasury, which embodies the 

 curved line, and in which he stated that the extent of sight was the 

 rule of common law as to jurisdiction over adjacent waters, and 

 stated that he supposed that 25 miles was the extent of sight. 



I refer first to the work of Schticking, " Das Kiistenmeer im Inter- 

 nationalen Recht." 



The extract from Schiicking which I am about to read commences 

 on p. 29 of his work and translated into English is as follows : 



" We cannot understand why Godey should replace the limit of the 

 territorial sea, proposed by the Institute, by the range of eyesight or 

 the horizon of a man standing at the coast. This means breaking off 

 with everything in use at the present time. The history of interna- 

 tional law knows only of one application of this principle in an Ordi- 

 nance of Philipp II, of Spain ! Yet Godey calls it ' consacre dans la 

 pratique,' sanctioned by usage ! or ' established in practice.' Bynker- 

 shoek critcises this view as follows: 



" Indeed it is too lax, it is vague and in no way certain enough. 

 How far does eyesight reach and shall it begin at a certain place on 



