1564 NORTH ATLANTIC COAST FISHERIES ARBITRATION. 



bunal to it. I refer to a recent English work published in London 

 in 1908, and it is called " Cardinal Rules of Legal Interpretation." 

 The writer of the work is Mr. Beale. I would especially direct the 

 attention of the Tribunal to what is referred to as " Lord Wensley- 

 dale's Golden Rule." Mr. Beale refers to it over and over again, 

 and he points out at pp. 74, 133, 302, and 525, that when you find a 

 word in a document, or a treaty, or a statute, you are to give it its 

 natural meaning, unless there is something very plain to the con- 

 trary. This rule was originally laid down in the case of Grey v. 

 Pearson, House of Lords Cases, 61, p. 106, where his Lordship said : 



" I have been long and deeply impressed with the wisdom of the 

 rule, now, I believe universally adopted, at least in the Courts of 

 Law in Westminster Hall, that in construing wills, and indeed stat- 

 utes, and all written instruments, the grammatical and ordinary 

 sense of the words is to be adhered to, unless that would lead to some 

 absurdity or some repugnance or inconsistency with the rest of the 

 instrument, in which case the grammatical and ordinary sense of the 

 words may be modified, so as to avoid that absurdity and inconsist- 

 ency, but no further. This is laid down by Mr. Justice Burton, in 

 a very excellent opinion, which is to be found in the case of War- 

 burton v. Loveland." 



We have, I think, all these English cases which are referred to 

 here, if the Tribunal should care to see them, but I am citing only 

 the extracts which give additional evidence in support of the doc- 

 trine laid down in this work " Cardinal Rules of Legal Interpreta- 

 tion." I call attention to another similar expression, that of Lord 

 Esher, Master of the Rolls, in Anderson v. Anderson, 1895, 1 Q. B., 

 749, who says : 



" I will take first the rule as stated by Lord Eldon in Church v. 

 Mundy, 1808, 15 Ves. 396, at page 406. He said 



" ' The best rule of construction is that which takes the words to 

 comprehend a subject that falls within their usual sense, unless there 

 is something like declaration plain to the contrary.' " 



Then Lord Esher goes on : 



" That is as I understand him, prima facie you are to give the 

 words their larger meaning unless you find something which plainly 

 shews that they were intended to be read in a more restricted 

 sense. 



947 " Nothing can well be plainer than to show that prima facie 

 general words are to be taken in their larger sense, unless you 

 can find that in the particular case the true construction of the instru- 

 ment requires you to conclude that they are intended to be used in a 

 sense limited to things ejusdem generis with those which have been 

 specifically mentioned before." 



He says that in that case the doctrine of ejusdem generis does not 

 apply. Lord Rigby, at p. 755, in the same case, uses the same expres- 

 sion, or states the same principle in a different form ; 



