1594 NORTH ATLANTIC COAST FISHERIES ARBITRATION. 



to involve a loss of what. I think, every nation regards as its most 

 treasured possession. It will mean that the}' have, in most cases I 

 am sure without knowing it, parted with the unity and completeness 

 of their national sovereignty; that they have lost the right so much 

 valued by every independent State to deal with all persons and things 

 on its own soil without foreign interference or control. 



When we talk about divided sovereignty, or of subjecting a nation 

 to a servitude, which has such consequences in regard to sovereignty 

 as those for which the United States contend here, we must not for- 

 get I am sure this Tribunal will not forget, though it is frequently 

 forgotten by many jurists that we are dealing with national inde- 

 pendence. It is no mere question of guiding or limiting and restrict- 

 ing the exercise of a sovereign power such as we may have in any 

 contract or treaty between States, or in any bargain between indi- 

 viduals. Of course it is common ground to both the disputants here 

 that every contract, this treaty among others, restricts the action of 

 sovereignty. That is not the contention with which this Tribunal is 

 now called upon to deal. It is no mere limitation or restriction upon 

 the exercise of a sovereign power for which the United States con- 

 tend. It is an absolute transfer of the power itself; and the differ- 

 ence between a restriction and a conveyance is one on which I need 

 not enlarge to this Tribunal, or to any body of legally trained men. 

 And the contention of the United States does not stop there. That 

 is a serious matter; but the learned counsel who have appeared on 

 behalf of the United States have felt themselves compelled by the 

 stress of their argument to go further than that, and to make clear 

 in argument that which was, perhaps, only implied in the written 

 pleadings submitted to the Tribunal, namely, that they are, in their 

 view, entitled to share in the enforcement of such regulations as they 

 may think proper, or as may be agreed; in other words, that it is 

 part of their right, conferred upon them by this treaty, that they 

 should, in times of peace, be at liberty, if their right is. in their view, 

 in any peril, to place armed forces upon the soil of a friendly Power, 

 for actual operation, if need be, against the citizens and sub- 

 965 jects of that Power. I venture to say this is a novel claim: it 

 is a startling claim; it is a claim which, of course, this Tribunal 

 would not dream of allowing, except upon the most explicit evidence 

 that it was the intention of the parties; because, although nations 

 may, in the unhappy course of events, become subjected to the control 

 or domination of foreign and hostile powers, yet they do not very 

 easily or very often consent to it. And the case for the United 

 States, here, is that Great Britain has consented to the situation 

 which they say has arisen. If so, then it must be clearly proved. 

 But it is a remarkable feature, one which meets the United States 

 at the very outset of their case, and which, still, I think they have 



