ARGUMENT OF SIR WILLIAM ROBSON. 1597 



Root everybody knows how difficult it is for any counsel to state 

 accurately his opponent's point, although I am trying to state it as 

 accurately as I can in order that I may deal with it effectively is 

 that that part of the case, and it constitutes a very large portion both 

 of the argument and the evidence, which dealt with the antecedent 

 rights of the United States, with their historic claims, is no longer 

 before this Tribunal as what I have called a ground of action. That 

 is a technical term in English law which, I am sure, is quite intelli- 

 gible to the Tribunal ; it means the ground which of itself, standing 

 alone, is sufficient to entitle the party to a judgment. The partition 

 of Empire theory, then, is not a ground of action. But, says Mr. 

 Turner, it has an important bearing upon the construction of the 

 document. Well, I listened with the greatest interest, as we all 

 listened to Mr. Turner's most able and learned speech, to see how he 

 applied this historic argument to the interpretation or construction 

 of the treaty. And I am bound to say that the most careful attention 

 has not illumined my mind as to how it bears relevantly upon con- 

 struction. But what Mr. Turner may possibly have left imperfect 

 Mr. Root may implement; he may make it good; and therefore T can- 

 not treat the subject as one not worthy of further observation. I 

 daresay if I had the very last word of all, there is a good deal of the 

 case which I might leave alone, and say : " It is not carried home," to 

 use an expression favoured among English lawyers ; that is to say, it 

 is not brought to a complete conclusion, and, inasmuch as it is imper- 

 fect, I do not further trouble about it. But I do not know how far 

 Mr. Root may finish the steps of the argument where it halts in 

 certain particulars ; so I cannot entirely neglect it. 



The claim itself, as I have said, is quite clear. It has been stated 

 with the greatest possible candour and fairness, such as the United 

 States have shown throughout the whole conduct of this case, from 

 the first to the last. Mr. Turner put it in a sentence. He said : Our 

 claim is to demand a voice, p. 1975 [p. 324 supra] : 



"We propose to have our own voice, and our own hand, and our 

 own participation not only in the making of these regulations but 

 in their enforcement. . . ." 



In other words; we are sovereign in the legislative sense, and our 

 sovereign power, it being a sovereign power, is not confined to legisla- 

 tion, but it has also its executive rights, and therefore we are entitled 

 to compel obedience to that which we properly require in the exercise 

 of our sovereign authority. And, of course, that compulsion cannot 

 be confined to its own citizens. Mr. Turner soon saw that. Again 

 he did not shrink, any more than any of their learned counsel on that 

 side have shrunk from the obvious logical and legitimate consequences 

 of their argument. You cannot enforce regulations, though they be 

 agreed to by both parties against one set of fishermen and not against 



