1598 NORTH ATLANTIC COAST FISHERIES ARBITRATION. 



the other. Because, if the United States desires to enforce regula- 

 tions at all, there is no need to enforce them, there is not likely to IKJ 

 any occasion to enforce them, against its own citizens ; because its own 

 citizens will be the complainants; they will be the injured parties: 

 and the exercise of sovereign authority and force will be against tin- 

 citizens of the other power concerned in the condominion. So that 

 it is a claim on the part of the United States to coerce, if need be. by 

 armed force, the citizens of Great Britain in Newfoundland who are 

 disobeying regulations which the United States thinks proper or 

 which are agreed to between the United States and England, 

 967 it may be. That is the claim of the United States. And it is 

 clear that the United States is right in saying that the reason- 

 ableness of our regulations is immaterial. That, I think, is obvious. 

 If they are in excess of our jurisdiction, it does not matter whether 

 they are reasonable or not ; and if they purport to apply to the United 

 States, why then, clearly, they would be to that extent in excess of 

 our jurisdiction, if the United States are right. And therefore they 

 are not concerned to discuss the reasonableness of our regulations at 

 all. They may be as reasonable as you like, but, say the United 

 States, they do not bind us without our consent. Of course, they do 

 not mean to be unreasonable. They say they will not be unreasonable, 

 but they claim the right not to submit or acquiesce, or to be compelled 

 to acquiesce in reasonable regulations. So that the local power of 

 Great Britain in this case would undoubtedly be left in a position of 

 very serious difficulty, with this partner in its sovereignty whom it has 

 no means of compelling to an agreement. The contract between them 

 has overlooked all the difficulties that might arise from such an 

 unusual and such a difficult situation. 



Of course, the United States say they will be reasonable. They say 

 it sincerely, of course, that they mean to be reasonable. But what is 

 the characteristic of a sovereign power? What is the characteristic, 

 for instance, of that which in private life is analogous to a sovereign 

 power ownership? The owner of property is not under any general 

 compulsion of law to use his property reasonably. There are some 

 things that are unreasonable, and if he does them, the law will pre- 

 vent or punish him. But as long as he keeps within that very limited 

 range of reasonableness prescribed by the law of the country in which 

 he lives, he has an immense range for unreasonableness. That is the 

 condition of the private owner. It is equally the status and the right 

 of the sovereign power, which may be as unreasonable as it likes, even 

 within a wider scope than that which is permitted to the private 

 owner. 



And what is reasonableness to a sovereign State? We had a very 

 excellent illustration of it in the argument, most lucid and interest- 

 ing, put to the Tribunal by Mr. Elder, in relation to the conduct of 



