ARGUMENT OF SIR WILLIAM ROBSON. 1601 



" The Tribunal shall recommend for the consideration of the High 

 Contracting Parties rules and a method of procedure under which 

 all questions which may arise in the future regarding the exercise of 

 the liberties above referred to may be determined in accordance with 

 the principles laid down in the Award." 



Those are very important words. The rules and procedure which 

 this Tribunal is empowered to lay down or recommend are in order 

 that future questions may be determined How? Not anyhow; not 

 with an absolute and unrestricted discretion on the part of those who 

 may follow the present Tribunal in deciding these subsequent dis- 

 putes ; not an absolute discretion, but " in accordance with the prin- 

 ciples laid down in the Award." 



Xow, if the Award on Question 1 be in favour of Great Britain, it 

 will be that Great Britain is entitled to make reasonable regulations. 

 We. have submitted to reasonableness as a condition in the question; 

 but I think it would be implied against us, whether we had submitted 

 to it or not. So that, if the answer to Question 1 be in favour of 

 Great Britain, any regulations that we make must be reasonable reg- 

 ulations; and if this Tribunal so decides, then the reasonableness of 

 those regulations, of course will be within the competence of this 

 Tribunal; because they will have decided by their Award, on this 

 hypothesis, that we are entitled to make reasonable regulations, and 

 they will also be entitled to say whether or not we are acting in 

 accordance with the principles laid down in the Award. 



But if the United States should succeed, then what will be the 

 principle laid down in the Award, if their contention be adopted? 

 It would be that they are under no compulsion to accede to any regu- 

 lations whatever. I think when I deal with this question of regula- 

 tions, which I am going to try to deal with shortly, because I know 

 how much the Tribunal have heard about it, and how thoroughly 

 they understand it, I shall only deal with it as I say, in trying to cast 

 some light on particular features of it. When I come to deal with it, 

 I think I shall show that upon their contention it is within their right 

 under the treaty, and indeed may very well be within their existing 

 opinion, that no regulation is necessary. Certainly their argu- 

 969 ment is that they cannot be compelled to assent under the 

 treaty; that the treaty provides no mode whatever by which 

 their consent to any regulation can be compelled. It is a sovereign 

 discretion. And, therefore, if they have an Award in their favour, 

 the matter seems to me to be beyond the competence of this Tribunal. 

 This Tribunal can decide whether or not regulations are reasonable, 

 but if it decides that one of the parties has the right in its uncon- 

 trolled sovereign authority and opinion to say that no regulations 

 are necessary, then I apprehend, however much the other side may 

 want regulations, it will have not locus standi before this Tribunal, 



