1700 NORTH ATLANTIC COAST FISHERIES ARBITRATION. 



of the United States is that it is the practice of nations which con- 

 stitutes the validity of this institution in international law. rather 

 than the perfection of the analogies which may be <lrawn between the 

 institution and the servitudes of the Roman law." 



I think there was another passage also; yes, at p. 2156 [p. 356 

 supra], in which Mr. Turner went a step farther; and I think that 

 step took him over the precipice altogether. He was dealing, in the 

 intervening pages, with the argument, and the* Tribunal was trying 

 rather to get some concise statement of his point. And Mr. Justice 

 Gray said: 



" I think I understand your contention, in so far as this author 

 supports it " 



They were talking of some particular author; it does not matter 

 which one 



" to be that there has grown up in international law, a right, or a 

 legal relation, which is conveniently called an international servitude 

 by analogy to the civil law servitude although not perfectly analo- 

 gous. It is sui generis. It is a limitation of sovereignty in its own 

 territory, not for the benefit of another prcedium, but of another 

 sovereignty." 



These are the words to which I draw attention : 

 " not for the benefit of another prcedium, but of another sovereignty." 



Now, says his Honour, Judge Gray: 



" That is the doctrine, as I understand it, that you put forward ? " 



And it was, if I may say so, a correct statement of Mr. Turner's 

 view ; and I read that because it is rather more compendiously stated 

 than it is on the preceding pages by Mr. Turner. Mr. Turner says : 



" That is the doctrine that I am going to endeavor to establish by 

 this reading upon which I have now entered." 



What is the meaning of that ? " Not for the benefit of another 

 prsedium, but of another sovereignty." So that the praulial element 

 is gone. It is not one pra^dium serving another pracdium; one terri- 

 tory serving the uses of another territory. That was Mr. Turner's 

 definition ; the Tribunal will remember that was the third feature in 

 his definition of a servitude: That it must be a case where one ter- 

 ritory serves the uses of another territory. It is that no longer. 

 Driven by his argument, Mr. Turner has to give up the dominant 

 pra?dium, to let it go, and in its place put n so vereigntv. In other 

 words, it ceased to be a prsedial servitude at all, and it becomes a 

 personal servitude, but a personal servitude vested in a corporate 

 body, not capable according to Roman law of holding such a servitude 

 beyond a definite time. So that it is no longer a prandial servitude. 



Now, just let us remember what his definition was of what a 

 servitude must be. If the Tribunal will remember, it must, he said, 



