ARGUMENT OF SIR WILLIAM ROBSOU. 1709 



definition of sovereignty. We look at sovereignty as you may define 

 it from several points of view. But, however you define sovereignty, 

 according to lawyers' conceptions of it, you cannot give an adequate 

 or proper definition without excluding this distinction between ter- 

 ritorial and general sovereignty. 



Sovereignty is the supreme governing power vested in some de- 

 fined person or persons over all persons and things within the limit 

 or under the control of a State. That is the modern view of sov- 

 ereignty. 



Nothing is gained by seeking to distinguish between that sov- 

 ereignty, thus widely defined, and what is called " territorial sov- 

 ereignty." 



The sovereignty, I would not say so much of a State, even that 

 is a little ambiguous expression, but the sovereignty under which 

 States are placed is just the same in respect of ships as it is in 

 respect of land. It may have some degree of ancient ownership rights 

 in land, but they are really not material to an enquiry of this kind 

 touching international law. 



And, I venture to say, not only that the word " servitude " is inap- 

 propriate, but the distinction between territorial and national sov- 

 ereignty is a somewhat risky distinction. It does not correspond to 

 anything real in the sphere of life with which we are dealing. The 

 State has just the same control over its land as it has over any other 

 class of article, or goods, so far as the expression " national sov- 

 ereignty " is concerned. It is - an obsolete conception that the State, 

 as dominus terrce, may create obligations with regard to its territory 

 which confer upon other States rights which do not attach to the 

 ordinary treaty obligations of a State. That distinction has not been 

 in international law a fertile or a fruitful distinction. I think on 

 the whole it has rather tended to create confusion. 



Well, I ask the Tribunal now to remember the propositions which 

 I said the United States must make good in order to establish this 

 doctrine of servitude. 



The first proposition, it may be remembered, was: They must 

 show that it was a doctrine well understood, universally understood, 

 at the time of the treaty. 



I think I am now in a position to say that at the time of the 

 treaty it was a doctrine which was practically unknown in inter- 

 national law. The international chicken, if I may use the expression, 

 had not emerged from the German shell until much later. Therefore 

 they have not established that proposition. 



The next was, that such servitudes brought about not merely a 



restriction of sovereignty, but a partition or transfer thereof. 



1034 I have now gone through the authorities. None of them up 



to 1818 established any such principle. Few of them indeed 



