ARGUMENT OF SIR WILLIAM ROBSON. 1769 



I say that when this right is given to the inhabitants of the United 

 States, the right to fish, it is given as a right to be exercised within 

 our jurisdiction. I have dealt with the argument that it is under 

 our jurisdiction. Nobody, of course, can deny that, geographically, 

 it is within our jurisdiction. Well, now, what does that involve 

 that they have the right to come by ships from abroad, into our 

 waters, and there they possess the privilege of doing that which is 

 not permitted to trading vessels. If a trading vessel were to come 

 within the 3-mile limit, and were to remain outside the coast, outside 

 the port some distance from a custom-house, not moving, not appar- 

 ently seeking any destination, but just wandering about, from one 

 quarter to another, the custom-house officer would say : " We must 

 have a report. What have you got on board ? " And a fishing- 

 vessel gets the right to do that thing. 



The first condition of the exercise of any such right on the part 

 of either a trading vessel or a fishing-vessel, under a trading treaty 

 or a fishing treaty I do not think it matters which is that the 

 right must be exercised consistently with the known, contemplated, 

 and well-understood laws of fiscal defence. I am using that phrase 

 because I think it is a convenient way of putting what I mean. It 

 was certainly not intended when this treaty was made that there 

 should be any kind of attack or injury upon the necessary customs 

 laws of the British dominions. The customs laws, then, as now, are 

 absolutely essential to the growth of a State. You cannot govern 

 without revenue. You cannot collect revenue without in some degree 

 resorting to customs duties ; and you cannot get your customs duties 

 without the observance of some perfectly well-known regulations. 

 Nothing novel; there is no question here of our demanding regula- 

 tions of a character that other nations do not demand. It may 

 be said that in particular instances they are vexations, because the 

 fishing-vessel does not want to come near a port, and yet may be 

 compelled to go there. Well, that is an inconvenience attaching to 

 the exercise of the right, and nobody would say that they are super- 

 fluously imposed, or that they are deliberately or vexatiously devised. 

 They are the ordinary duties and obligations that every vessel, under 

 any treaty, must observe in exercising any right. 



You do not, when you are making a commercial treaty, so far as 

 I know, say that the vessel must subject itself to certain obligations 

 of customs entry or report. All that is taken for granted. It is 

 taken for granted, perhaps, because the vessel cannot help it; it 

 cannot get into the port to do its business unless it does report. But 

 supposing that under a treaty which gives a vessel the right to enter 

 and unload its goods, it chooses to say: "We will not go into port 

 at all, to unload. There is nothing put in the treaty to say that we 

 must go into the harbour, and we will unload in a creek." In such 

 92909 S. Doc. 870, 61-3, vol 11 13 



