ARGUMENT OF ELIHU ROOT. 2107 



THE PRESIDENT: Fishing would be a violation, yes. Without vio- 

 lation of regulations and with violation, would be slightly different, 

 I think, in that case. The principal offence would be the fishing. 



SENATOR ROOT: Yes, but that of itself would be a violation. 



THE PRESIDENT: That of itself would have been a violation. 

 Therefore it would not have been necessary to have a penalty 

 attached to fishing, under certain circumstances, because the fishing 

 itself would have been punishable. 



SENATOR ROOT: Certainly, fishing itself would be punishable. 

 There were provisions relating to boats " preparing to fish " as lead- 

 ing so directly to the act itself as to amount to a substantive offence 

 in itself. We may readily conceive quite appropriate regulations to 

 prevent the privilege of shelter, repair, wood, and water, from being 

 abused by fishing; regulations quite consistent with those, but nec- 

 essary to prevent the abuse, and designed for that purpose; regula- 

 tions not in themselves pointing to fishing. So that there might 

 well be regulations which might be violated by American fishermen 

 on the non-treaty coast regulations appropriate and necessary to 

 prevent an abuse, and designed for the protection of the fisheries, 

 and by which they would be bound. 



I do not suppose Mr. Boutwell refined about it as much as we may 

 in discussing it, but what he was talking about was regulation on 

 that non-treaty coast. That is perfectly clear. And it is perfectly 

 clear there were provisions designed for the preservation of the 

 fisheries answering to his description: 



" Fishermen of the United States are bound to respect the British 

 laws and regulations for the preservation of the fisheries to the same 

 extent as they are applicable to Canadian fishermen." 



Speaking only of the non-treaty coast. That is quite a reasonable 

 proposition, and not anything inapplicable to the non-treaty coast. 



So that I think the Boutwell circular goes with the Marcy circular 

 and the Cardw r ell letter, and there is nothing left at all of the Bout- 

 well circular, for nowhere on either side in any transaction, letter, 

 or reported interview, or written or printed matter, is there any 

 expression of opinion of any kind regarding the rights and powers 

 of the respective parties, or their subjects or inhabitants upon the 

 treaty coast. 



As to the Marcy circular, and as to the Cardwell letter, there is 

 nothing to be said, except that in each case a British official, not of 

 the Foreign Office, and not charged with interpreting the position 

 of the Government of Great Britain upon an international question, 

 expressed an opinion involving the natural assumption that British 

 law was supreme in British territory, without adverting to any 

 question of distinction between the general jurisdiction, and jurisdic- 



