2116 NORTH ATLANTIC COAST FISHERIES ARBITRATION. 



exercised at any time or in any manner which the grantee of the right 

 deems proper to the exercise thereof. 



In this case, as in the other, we are precluded from considering 

 that the grantor nation, which had by the grant excluded itself from 

 the rightful exercise of its sovereignty, within the field covered by 

 the grant, should assume to exercise over the subject-matter of the 

 grant an authority which, in its nature, would make it possible for 

 the grantor practipally to destroy the value of the grant 



In this case, as in the other, we are precluded from considering that 

 it was within the contemplation of the parties that the grantor should 

 continue to exercise an authority in respect of the subject-matter of 

 the grant which, when applied to the grant in terms perpetual, would, 

 in the ordinary course of human affairs, ultimately lead to the desire 

 coupled with the power to destroy the value of the grant. 



We are precluded from considering that the right vested in the 

 grantee by the contract is to be treated by the grantor as being of a 

 lower degree of sanctity and inviolability than the common right 

 declared by the contract to remain in the subjects of the grantor. 



We are precluded from considering that it was the intention of the 

 parties that the common right of the grantee should be subject in its 

 exercise to the control of the grantor, while the equal common right 

 of the grantor was not to be subject to control by the grantee. 



In this case, as in the other, the principle of equality of right rest- 

 ing upon the contract remains as inviolable as the principle of equal- 

 ity of right resting upon the ownership of a right by an independent 

 nation to which it has been conveyed, according to the American 

 view. 



There is no principle of law or reason which justifies one party to 

 a contract in limiting or modifying the exercise of the other 

 1280 party to the contract in accordance with the first party's own 

 judgment as to what is for the common interest irrespective of 

 the judgment of the other party to the contract. There is no warrant 

 for assuming in this case, more than in the other, that in the ab- 

 sence of express provision in the contract the parties intended that 

 one party to the contract should exercise such a power over the 

 rights of the other party. 



When Great Britain concedes, as she does in the statement of Ques- 

 tion 1, that regulations of the common right must be reasonable, 

 necessary, fair, &c., she concedes a limitation upon her sovereignty 

 which precludes the exercise of her sole judgment to impose restric- 

 tions in her sole will. When Great Britain argues, as she does here, 

 that there was an implied reservation of the sovereignty which enables, 

 justifies, or authorizes her to be the sole judge of what is reasonable, 

 necessary, and fair, she reinstates in her conception of her rights the 

 very principle that she abjured when she put into the statement of 



