2306 NORTH ATLANTIC COAST FISHERIES ARBITRATION. 



The difficulty of conducting, on the more rigid nile, a lengthened 

 enquiry, involving frequent decisions, is a matter of ordinary ex- 

 perience. A common mode of escape from it is to fix some number, 

 short of the entire complement, as the quorum or minimum number 

 which must be present to give validity to a decision. The framers 

 of the Washington Treaty adopted an arrangement somewhat differ- 

 ent in form, but similar in effect. They laid down that the decisions 

 should be valid so long as they were adopted by a number not less 

 than the majority of the whole body. That this is the meaning of the 

 three passages in which the word majority appears may be gathered 

 both from the expressions themselves and from the connection in 

 which they are found. The following is a portion of the first para- 

 graph of article 13 on the Commission of Civil War Claims : 



"They shall be bound to receive and consider all written documents or 

 statements which may be presented to them by or on behalf of their 

 1393 respective Governments in support of, or in answer to, any claims; and 

 to hear, if required, one person on each side, on behalf of each Govern- 

 ment, as counsel, or agent for such Government, on each and every separate 

 claim. A majority of the Commissioners shall be sufficient for an award in 

 each case." 



Here it is evident that the multiplicity of the claims was the mat- 

 ter specially under consideration ; and that " the sufficiency of a 

 majority of the commission for an award" was stipulated with a 

 view to the possible delay which the requirement of a full Tribunal 

 in each case might cause. That the majority should be sufficient for 

 an award in the case of one member being absent was a rule which it 

 was necessary to lay down ; for where frequent decisions are not re- 

 quired, provisions of the kind are not customary. On the other 

 hand, it is a universal practice that upon public arbitrations thus 

 constituted, in case of difference of opinion, the majority shall pre- 

 vail. It is, therefore, consistent with sound principles of interpre- 

 tation, to assume that the phrase was meant to apply to the point on 

 which a provision was necessary, and not to the point on which a 

 provision was superfluous. 



The same reasoning is applicable to the case of the Geneva Tri- 

 bunal, which had to decide on the alleged failure of neutral duty in 

 Great Britain as to seventeen different ships, besides questions aris- 

 ing in respect to damages. The Board of Assessors which was pro- 

 vided in case the Geneva Tribunal had not awarded a gross sum was a 

 Commission of Claims which would have had to ad]udicate upon a 

 very large number of individual losses. In these cases, therefore, as 

 in that which has been just adverted to, the Joint High Commission 

 took a natural and a judicious course in providing that a decision 

 should not be invalid by reason of the absence of a member of the 

 Tribunal, so long as a majority concurred in the award. 



On the other hand, no such provision was necessary in the case of 

 the Halifax Commission, which, beyond question of procedure, had 

 but one issue before it, and but one decision to pronounce. In this 

 case it was not necessary to lay down, as in the other cases, that " a 

 majority of the Commissioners should be sufficient for an award," or 

 that "all questions should be decided by a majority of all the 

 arbitrators." 



This construction of the treaty appears to Her Majesty's Govern- 

 ment more natural and more respectful to the Joint High Commis- 



