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B I M A N A. 



bringing the whole subject at once before the mind ; 

 and" as it is not easy, if the known makes a due im- 

 pression, to prevent speculation with regard to the 

 uiiknown.contradictions are apt to appear, which farther 

 instruction would completely explain away, but which 

 remain and ripen into errors if that additional in- 

 struction is not given. When the mistakes happen 

 upon points which are connected with material nature 

 only, they are of less moment, as they affect only the 

 intelligence of the parties, and not their moral habits ; 

 but still it is very desirable to avoid them even then, 

 inasmuch as mere goodness, without intelligence, is 

 at best but a feeble and even a frail virtue. 



Feeling that the error of confounding man with 

 the system of material nature is the grand error, 

 which not only destroys the better part of the human 

 character, but spoils the rest of nature to man's con- 

 templation, we, as anxious to produce a work of 

 popular as well as scientific usefulness, have taken 

 occasion, in our notices of apes, beavers, and other 

 animals, which have, in some parts at least of their 

 economy, been frequently confounded with man, to 

 point out in what the difference really consists ; and 

 now, in this article, or at least in one of similar 

 import, where man is usually confounded with the 

 animals, we have gone over some of the proofs of 

 the existence of mind in man, which arise from the 

 mere study of nature, and without reference to that 

 which is revealed in the Scriptures, and which could 

 not have been arrived at by any study of nature, 

 however extensive or however accurate : otherwise 

 revelation would not have been necessary. 



We may, however, remark, in passing, that there 

 is that correspondence between the evidence of 

 nature and the evidence of revelation, which shows 

 that they both emanate from the same source that 

 the God of Nature and the God of Grace is one 

 and the same. In both, partial views are apt to lead 

 to erroneous conclusions ; so that, in order to arrive 

 at the truth, we must study the whole revelation of 

 God in his word as well as in his works ; and if we do 

 so, we are sure to find not only that each is perfect 

 and conclusive in itself, but that the two are in perfect 

 harmony with each other : with only this difference, 

 that the law of God, as manifested in nature, is for all 

 the creatures which he has made ; while the law as 

 revealed in his word is peculiarly and exclusively for 

 man. 



It is the omission of the consideration of man as 

 having an immaterial and immortal spirit, in addition 

 to the body, and the consideration of the latter only 

 as part of natural history, which gives the reality or 

 the appearance (for it is the appearance more fre- 

 quently than the reality) of materialism to this branch 

 of knowledge ; this, therefore, is the view we have 

 taken in the present article, the one in which man 

 is more directly considered as part of the general 

 system of animated nature, as the most proper 

 one under which to show that, even in a natural 

 history point of view, man cannot be regarded 

 as a being wholly composed of matter, but that the 

 material body is only the instrument by means of 

 which the mental or immortal part acts. If the 

 arguments, or rather the proofs (for when all the 

 evidence tends one way there cannot, strictly speak- 

 ing, be any argument) which we have adduced be 

 properly considered, we feel confident that they will 

 be found conclusive. We have endeavoured to express 

 them in plain and simple language, without any of 



the technicalities which ajre usually employed upon 

 such subjects, in order that they may be generally 

 understood ; and we have made them, in as far as 

 possible, new, both in form and in substance, in order 

 that they may be the more striking. 



Viewing what man does, in opposition to what is 

 done by the other animals, the sum of the whole 

 argument for mind is that man is the only living 

 creature in the world in which there is a principle 

 or capacity of self-improvement, by means of which 

 one generation, availing itself of the experience of 

 the generations which preceded it, can become better 

 informed than they ; or which, by failing to exercise 

 the means by which this improvement is attainable, 

 can deteriorate and fall off. That which is formed of 

 matter, in what manner soever that matter may be 

 organised, cannot have such a principle, unless we 

 suppose that matter, in the case of man, is endowed 

 with properties not only different from but absolutely 

 contrary to those which it possesses, either generally, 

 as inorganic matter, or peculiarly, in consequence of 

 the particular organisation and instincts of any animal. 



Those instincts are often very curious ; and they 

 are, in their operation, perfectly inexplicable to us, 

 not only in those cases in which " an inferior degree 

 of reason" has been inconsiderately ascribed to the 

 animal, but even in those more simple instances 

 which pass under our notice every day without in the 

 slightest degree attracting our attention. That " the 

 ox should know his owner, and the ass his master's 

 crib," is just as wonderful as that the beaver should 

 build a habitation against the winter, or the bee con- 

 struct its cell so as to have the maximum of room and 

 of strength out of the minimum of materials. The 

 manners and habits of all creatures are useful sub- 

 jects of study, not only because they are very curious 

 in themselves, and evince purpose and design in the 

 creation, which we can neither mistake nor refrain 

 from admiring, but also because there is in each of 

 them an example which we can always in so far- 

 imitate for our practical advantage. The latter 

 must be the case : all the actions of animals, of what 

 kind soever they may be, have for their object the 

 counteracting or opposing of some of the properties 

 or laws of inorganic matter ; and as the natural ac- 

 tions of animals are all, upon the average, successful, 

 it follows that they do, upon the average, over- 

 come those properties and laws. Of the principles 

 in which those instincts originate we do not under- 

 stand, nor can we hope to understand, any thing, be- 

 cause we do not understand the principle upon which 

 the most simple substance in nature possesses its 

 most simple quality ; but they all operate by means, 

 and not by miracles ; and those means are always 

 open to our investigation. We cannot, for instance, 

 say why one animal flies in the air, another swims in 

 the water, and a third burrows in the earth ; but we 

 can always observe the organisation which it employs 

 for that or for any other purpose ; and, upon observ- 

 ing it carefully, we invariably find that the end is 

 accomplished by means which are in perfect accord- 

 ance with the principles of mechanics, as applied to 

 inorganic matter. All the common external actions 

 of animals are, indeed, strictly mechanical, or em- 

 ployed in the overcoming of mechanical resistances ; 

 and that is the reason why there is so much practical 

 advantage in the study of them. 



But though we cannot tell in what manner the in- 

 stinctive impulse in the animal acts, or why one 



