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The Review of Reviews. 



in another. For instance, you contend that if Germany 

 conquered TSritain it would profit her nothing. I agree 

 that the co.st of conquest would make the operation 

 financially unprofitable. But you argue as if Germany 

 being, let us say, suddenly in a position- to dictate 

 terms of peace to England, could not profit by such a 

 position of vantage." 



" Do you think she could ? " 



" Certainly she could. For instance, she need impose 

 no tribute, levy no indemnity, annex no territory. All 

 that she need do would be to compel Britain to place 

 the administration and control of the British Navy 

 exclusively in German hands. They need not interfere 

 with our self-government. They would man, control, 

 and command the Navy, and we would pay just the 

 same Naval Estimates as before. Nay, they might even 

 promise to save us twenty millions a year in the cost 

 of the Navy, since the old Anglo-German rivalry would- 

 be extinct. They could disband their oW'n navy, and 

 command the seas with one-half of the British fleet. 

 Each nation would be saved twenty millions a year ; 

 and Germany would be master alike of sea and of 

 land." 



" I would like to put on my considering cap," said 

 Norman Angcll, "before fully answering that objection. 

 But practically it amounts to nothing. You cannot 

 postulate the costless conquest of Britain, and the 

 attempt at conquest would cost Germany more than, 

 in your hypothesis, she would save by annexing our 

 fleet. Besides, the gain of a reduction of estimates 

 might be brought about more simply, by a friendly 

 agreement without a war." 



" Agreed ! " I answered. " I was only pointing out 

 what seemed to me an unnecessary overstatement. 

 Now I come to your understatement. You dwell 

 rightly and wisely upon the extent to which the whole 

 fabric of modern society is built up on credit, and j'ou 

 point out how disastrous war would effect indlistrial 

 pro.sperity. But you might strengthen your argument 

 by pointing out an even more conclusive argument 

 against war in the modern state." 



" And what may that be ? " 



" The absolute certainty that no war between the 

 two '1 riples could ever be fought to a finish by naval 

 or military weapons. The one dominating factor 

 of the fate of nations is not the Sword ; it is the 

 Stomach. How long do you think Germany could 

 have kept on the war if it had broken out last 

 midsummer ? " 



" One of the leading bankers was asked that question 

 the other evening," said Norman Angcll. " He replied, 

 ' Not longer than a month.' He was speaking solely as 

 a financier." 



" The financial crash will he bad, but it is the 

 secondary effects of the collapse of ' redit which will 

 he decisive. Germany, like Britain, lives from hand to 

 mouth. She has now twenty millions more people to 



feed than she had in 1871. These people are fed from 

 abroad. They live from hand to mouth. Their daily 

 bread depends upon the uninterrupted working of the 

 vast complex machinery of modern commerce. In 

 olden times every community was a self-contained, 

 self-sustained, self-feeding unit. That da)' is gone for 

 ever. We live from hand to mouth to such an extent 

 that a two-days' railway strike brought our industrial 

 North Country towns within sight of famine." 



" There are countries which feed themselves." 



" Yes. In Russia there is food enough for 

 her millions. Turkey also, and sparsely-peopled 

 countries need not starve, but if a densely-peopled 

 industrial communitv goes to war it cuts its own 

 throat." 



" Then, if w^ar broke out between the Triples, what 

 do you think would happen ? " 



" A cataclysm, in which society would temporarily 

 disappear — a catastrophe, in which all thought of 

 carrying on war against the foreigner would be effaced 

 by the far more pressing necessity of finding lations 

 for starving millions. The twenty additional millions 

 of Germans, instead of being an added strength, are 

 so many useless mouths that would demand food, and 

 no food would be forthcoming. The same thing would 

 happen to us if we lost command of the sea." 



" I think there is a good deal in what you say,"' 

 said Mr. Norman Angell, " but even my moderate 

 understatement, as .you call it, has penetrated far 

 and wide. My little book has been translated into 

 many languages, and I hear echoes of its doctrine in 

 quarters where the book itself is unknown." 



" Lord Esher told me the other day," I replied, 

 " that he was one of the first to recognise the immense 

 cogency of your argument. He bought copies of your 

 book and sent them to half the sovereigns and states- 

 men of Europe." 



" I have never seen Lord Esher," said Norman 

 Angell, " though I owe him- very much. He wrote 

 suggesting that I should expand my argument, as he 

 believed that it would have more influence than any 

 book since Seeley published his ' Expansion of 

 England.' " 



" Thinking over your thesis," I said, " .suggests to 

 me that modern civili,sed society is like a city built 

 upon a frozen lake. If a thaw comes the whole city 

 will descend into the depths. Our credit system, our 

 hand-to-mouth system, are the foundations of our 

 industrial civilisation. They presuppose as a con- 

 dition precedent a state of uninterrupted peace. 

 When war comes the whole fabric will collapse." 



" Yes," said Norman Angell, " and the notion of 

 keeping the thing going by armaments is as absurd 

 as if the builders of your city on ice were to try to 

 keep off a thaw by surrounding it with walls, which 

 not only are powerless to prevent a thaw, but increase 

 the pressure on the ice when the frost gives." 



