218 THE PRINCIPLES OF HEREDITY 



mind the pain of the bite. We are helpless in the grip of 

 our desires. We follow unopposed desires, or the stronger of 

 two conflicting desires implicitly. But even after " decision " 

 an opposing desire may rise up in the court of our minds, 

 and, by appealing strongly for reversal of judgment, cause us 

 to falter and hesitate. Happy is he whose desires, once 

 rejected, cease their clamour. Him we term a resolute man. 



370. If then a man deliberately decides to burn his finger 

 he follows a course dictated by the stronger of two desires. 

 His action, therefore, is certainly voluntary in the only right 

 sense of the term. It is not contrary to his desires, nor does it 

 occur in the absence of desire. But he feels continually the 

 strong pull of the rejected desire ; hence his sense of 

 hesitancy, of doubt, of effort. But when he has only one 

 motive for action, and when, therefore, he acts instantly 

 without hesitation or apparent effort, his act is none the less 

 voluntary. An act of deliberation is one thing ; a voluntary 

 act is quite another thing. It is not necessarily a resultant 

 of opposing desires, but may result from only one. An act 

 of deliberation invariably occupies an appreciable interval of 

 time ; a voluntary action may be " as quick as thought " ; 

 so quick that the man is hardly conscious of his pain and his 

 desire to end it before his finger is out of the flame. In a 

 future chapter we shall be in a position to set forth all this 

 more fully and convincingly than we are able to do at 

 present. 



371. In a being mentally so complex as man it is not 

 always very easy to trace the connection between his 

 voluntary actions and his desire for pleasure or his aversion 

 to pain. In lower animals in proportion to the simplicity of 

 their mental operations, the connection is more easily per- 

 ceived. Thus, when a religious enthusiast deprives himself 

 of luxuries in order that he may support a missionary enter- 

 prise, the connection between pleasure and pain and the 

 voluntary act is less obvious than when the tiger stalks his 

 prey, or even when a bird deprives herself to feed her nest- 

 ling. It is evident, however, that in all these instances again 

 the individual is so constituted that an opposite course 

 would give more pain or less pleasure. To the tiger's desire 

 nothing is opposed, and therefore he acts without hesitation. 

 The bird and the man derive greater satisfaction, or suffer 

 less pain from the deprivation than they would have done 

 from the indulgence. But they feel the strong desire for 

 immediate pleasure. Hence the sense of hesitation, and of 

 what we call effort. 



