VOLUNTARY ACTION 221 



Most authorities, however, place instinctive actions in the 

 involuntary or reflex category. Presently we shall be in a 

 position to discuss this question with advantage, and shall 

 then see that there are good grounds for holding that 

 instinctive (as also automatic) acts are voluntary in a very 

 real sense. 



374. Not only the instinctive impulse (the instinct properly 

 so called), but also the power of performing the instinctive 

 action which results from the impulse, is usually inborn; 

 whereas, not only the rational impulse, but the power of 

 giving effect to it is acquired. For example, the caterpillar 

 builds as a place of shelter a cocoon, and a man a house. 

 The caterpillar acts on an inborn mental impulse. He has 

 had no previous experience of cocoons and can have no idea 

 of the purposes they serve. Very probably he has never 

 seen one before. But he acts as if he knew all about the 

 uses of cocoons and the proper method of building them. 

 Driven by his inborn impulse he sets to work at the fit time 

 and place. Notwithstanding the total lack of all practice, 

 his bodily parts act in exact co-ordination. Apparently his 

 work in its beginnings is as perfect as in its endings. 

 Unaided by memory, by learning, by practice, by acquired 

 mental and physical traits, he rears an elaborate structure 

 precisely suited to his needs. The man builds his house in 

 quite a different fashion. He has no instinctive impulse to 

 build, and no inborn dexterity ; but he has a clear idea of 

 what he wants. Memory furnishes him with his impulse 

 and his knowledge ; practice confers on him his dexterity. 

 If a caterpillar observed other caterpillars working, and 

 noted how, and inferred why they builded, and concluded 

 finally that it would be beneficial if he did the like, his 

 action would be rational. He would depend on his memory, 

 on his acquired mental traits, on his power of using past 

 experience for the guidance of future conduct. In effect, he 

 would think " Such and such actions were beneficial for such 

 and such reasons to other caterpillars ; let me therefore 

 imitate them." Such a caterpillar would work clumsily at 

 first, but with greater skill later. If the man, on the other 

 hand, were impelled to build his house by an inborn mental 

 impulse, and wrought perfectly without previous knowledge, 

 practice, and forethought, both his impulse and his power of 

 giving effect to it would be instinctive. The distinction 

 between instinct and what we have termed reason, then, is 

 clear. The one depends on inborn mental traits, the other 

 on acquired mental characters. INSTINCT, therefore, may be 



