270 THE PRINCIPLES OF HEREDITY 



higher forms instinct is probably accompanied by a rudi- 

 mentary consciousness. There cannot be co-ordination of 

 many stimuli without some ganglion through which they are 

 all brought into relation. In the process of bringing them 

 into relation this ganglion must be subject to the influence 

 of each must undergo many changes. And the quick 

 succession of changes in the ganglion, implying as it does 

 perpetual experiences of differences and likenesses, constitutes 

 the raw material of consciousness. The implication is, that 

 as instincts developed, some kind of consciousness must have 

 become nascent." 1 



435. It seems, then, that Mr. Spencer regards consciousness 

 as an accidental accompaniment of instinct (and presumably 

 of intelligence also), not as an essential part of it. But some 

 instinctive (and intelligent) actions, such as winking the 

 eye when in fear of injury, are exceedingly simple, whereas 

 some reflex actions are highly complex. " No one thinks of 

 sneezing, or the convulsions produced by tickling, as examples 

 of instinctive actions. Yet they are compound reflex actions 

 to a degree of compounding not easily paralleled, and 

 certainly much more so than any of the psychical adjust- 

 ments which are given by Mr. Spencer as illustrations of 

 instinct." 2 So also some intelligent actions are very simple, 

 whereas some instinctive actions are highly complex; for 

 example, web-spinning by spiders. Intelligent action, there- 

 fore, cannot be correctly described as arising out of "in- 

 stinctive action which has grown too highly complex to be 

 perfectly instinctive." Moreover, as I say, instinct does not 

 merge into intelligence and reason, but is sharply divided 

 from it. There is, therefore, no more reason to suppose, as 

 Mr. Spencer does, that intelligence arises out of instinct 

 than for supposing, as Mr. Lewes does, that instinct arises 

 out of intelligence. 



436. Mental acquirements are clearly not transmissible. 

 Having arisen in the parent through the stimulus of use, 

 they do not arise in the offspring through the stimulus of 

 nutrition. All the objections to the Lamarckian doctrine 

 which we found so decisive when discussing physical char- 

 acters retain their full force when applied to mental char- 

 acters. Indeed they are even more decisive as more patently 

 opposed to the facts. Mr. Spencer's hypothesis is not only 

 controverted by the evidence, it is actually unintelligible. 

 It is impossible to understand why the mere co-ordination 



1 The Principles of Psychology, vol. i., pp. 434, 435. 



2 Romanes, Mental Evolution in Animals, p. 258. 



