October 21, 1915] 



NATURE 



217 



lands at present lying waste, uncultivated, or un- 

 it oductive," and that means should at once be adopted 

 1 add at least 150,000 and perhaps 300,000 acres to 

 lie land under cultivation "as the only effectual means 

 I preventing that importation of corn, and disadvan- 

 ii(es therefrom, by which this country has already 

 -) deeply suffered." 



The main cause of high prices and scarcity was the 

 failure of the harvests. Mr. Prothero thus analyses 

 the wheat harvests of the twenty-two years 1793-1814 : 

 " Fourteen were deficient ; in seven out of the fourteen 

 the crops failed to a remarkable extent, namely, in 

 1795, 1799, 1800, 1809, 1810, 181 1, j8i2. Six produced 

 an average yield. Only two, 1796 and 1813, were 

 abundant ; but the latter was long regarded as the best 

 within living memory."* 



. It appears paradoxical, but in a sense it is true, 

 to say that the scarcity of wheat in certain j^ears arose 

 from the fact that the country was too largely de- 

 pendent on its own crop. The risk of a bad harvest in 

 a climate such as that of the British Isles must always 

 be serious, and by the fortune of war this risk between 

 1793 and 1814 turned out to be very high. When 

 supplies are drawn from the four quarters of the gl^be, 

 it is evident that the risk of a shortage in time of 

 peace is greatly reduced. Whether in a great war it 

 IS preferable to be more dependent on the sea than on 

 the season is debatable. 



In comparison with wars for national existence, 

 such as that against Napoleon, and in a still sterner 

 sense that in which we are now engaged, other con- 

 flicts appear insignificant. The Crimean War, how- 

 ever, did affect our food supplies and had a reflex 

 action on British agriculture. The cessation of imports 

 from Russia caused a rise in the price of corn. The 

 average price of wheat rose to 725. 5^. per qr. in 1854, 

 745. 8d. in 1855, and 695. id. in 1856. Only once 

 before (in 1839) during the previous thirty-five years 

 had it risen above 705. There were then no agricul- 

 tural returns, but the estimates of Lawes, which were 

 generally accepted, put the area under wheat at a little 

 more than 4,000,000 acres, a higher figure than has 

 been suggested for any other period. It is, indeed, 

 highly probable that the Crimean War marked the 

 maximum of wheat cultivation in this countr^^ It was 

 a time of great agricultural activity and of rapid pro- 

 gress. To their astonishment, farmers had found, 

 after an interval of panic, that the Repeal of the Corn 

 Laws had not obliterated British agriculture, and that 

 even the price of wheat was not invariably lower than 

 it had o<"ten been before 1846. Caird had preached 

 " High Farming " in i8j8 and found manv disciples, 

 capital was poured into the land, and the high prices 

 of the Crimean period stimulated enterprise and re- 

 stored confidence in agriculture. 



To generalise verv roughly, it mav be said that 

 while the Napoleonic wars were followed by the 

 deepest depression in agriculture, the Crimean War 

 was followed by a heyday of agricultural prosperity 

 which lasted for more than twenty years. What the 

 agricultural sequel to the present war may be, I leave 

 to others to estimate, and I turn to consider briefly 

 some of its effects on British farming up to the present 

 time. 



Harvest had just beeun when war broke out on 

 August 4 ; indeed, in the earlier districts a good deal 

 of corn was already cut. The harvest of 1914 was, 

 in fact, with the exception of that of 191 1, the earliest 

 of recent years, as it was also one of the most quickly 

 S'athered. The agricultural situation may perhaps be 

 concisely shown by giving the returns of the croos 

 then in hand, i.e. in course of gathering or in the 

 ground, with the numbers of live stock as returned on 



S " Eniflish Farming, Pa«» :vnd Present," p. 269. 



NO. 2399, VOL. 96] 



farms in the previous June. The figures are for the 

 United Kingdom, and I add the average for the pre- 

 ceding ten years for comparison : — 



Farmers had thus rather more than their usual 

 supplies of nearly every crop, the chief deficiencies 

 being in peas, roots, and hay. The shortage of the 

 hay crop was, however, in some measure made up by 

 the large stocks left from the unusually heavy, crop 

 of 1913. It was fortunate from the food-supply point 

 of view that two of the most plentiful crops were wheat 

 and potatoes. The head of cattle was very satisfac- 

 tory, being the largest on record, and pigs were well 

 above average. Sheep, always apt to fluctuate in 

 numbers, were much below average, the total being 

 the smallest since 1882 with the exception of 1913. 



On the whole, it was a good year agriculturally, 

 and the supply of home-grown produce at the begin- 

 ning of the war was bountiful. Nature at any rate 

 had provided for us more generously than we had a 

 right to e.xpect. 



At first it appeared as if farmers were likely to be 

 sufferers rather than gainers by the war. Prices of 

 feeding-stuffs, especially linseed and cotton-cakes, 

 maize-meal, rice-meal, and barley-meal, rose at once, 

 recruiting affected the labour supply, and difficulties 

 arose in the distribution of produce by rail. With one 

 or two exceptions, such as oats, the prices of. farm 

 produce showed but little rise for three or four months 

 after the war began. Wheat rose about 10 per cent., 

 barley remained about normal, cattle by November 

 had not risen more than 3 per cent., sheep and veal- 

 calves showed no rise until December, while poultry 

 was actually cheaper than usual, though eggs rose 

 considerably. Butter rose slightly, and cheese re- 

 mained about normal. Up to nearly the end of the 

 year, in fact, it may be said generally that British 

 farm-produce made very little more money than usual. 



Meanwhile, the nation began to take a keen interest 

 in the agricultural resources of the country, and farm- 

 ing became the object of general solicitude. We 

 started with great energy to improvise, in truly British 

 fashion, the means of facing the supreme crisis of our 

 fate, but the elementary fact at once became obvious 

 that it is impossible to improvise food. The main 

 farm-crops take an unreasonably long time to grow, 

 even if the land is prepared for them, and a sudden 

 extension of the area under cultivation is not a simple 

 pnopositlon. It was freely pointed out — with un- 

 deniable truth — that our agricultural system had not 

 been arranged to meet the conditions of a great 

 European war, and many suggestions were made to 

 meet the emergency. Some of these suggestions in- 

 volved Intervention by legislative or administrative 

 action. It was decided that any attempt violently to 



