November i8, 19 15] 



NATURE 



,11 



the same lectures to work out a phenomenalist 

 philosophy of science. All physical science starts 

 with directly observable sense-data, and physical 

 laws can only be verified by finding- that predic- 

 tions as to the nature of sense-data based on these 

 laws are actually borne out by direct observation. 

 According-ly Russell argues that it is theoretically 

 possible, on the principle of Ockham's razor, to 

 state all that is implied by the laws of physics in 

 terms of sense-data alone. 



Mr. Broad urges (a) that Russell's attempt at 

 phenomenalism is not nearly so "economical" as 

 he supposes. Whereas the ordinary view assumes 

 imperceptible physical objects, the qualities and 

 existence of which are inferred from sense-data, 

 Russell gives us an immensely g^reater number of 

 imperceptible sense-data, likewise inferred from 

 the sense-data of which we are immediately aware, 

 which are of the same logical kind as physical 

 objects on the ordinary view. The difference in 

 simplicity is not, then, in Russell's favour. 

 (/>) Russell's theory is very far from expressing- 

 the laws of physics in terms of sense-data. E.f;., 

 take the statement that iron expands when heated. 

 It is not enough to say that if a certain group of 

 grey visual sense-data is accompanied by a certain 

 group of hot tactual sense-data, then as the latter 

 get hotter the former get larg-er. Usually the 

 increase in leng-th can only be detected by a micro- 

 meter g-auge. But the micrometer must in turn 

 be analysed into visual and tactual sense-data, and 

 further the facts which on the ordinary physical 

 theory we call the proper use of the micrometer 

 must ai'so be resolved into muscular and other 

 sense-data. Exact statement of a physical law in 

 purely phenomenal terms is, therefore, intolerably 

 complicated. What physical science and common 

 sense do is to analyse such complicated but 

 directly verifiable .statements into two laws more 

 general but not separately verifiable, one as to 

 changes outside the body, " Iron expands when 

 heated," and the other stating- the action of 

 external objects upon the body which results in 

 the awareness of sense-data and of changes in 

 them. 



In a paper entitled "Complexity and Synthesis " 

 Mrs. Adrian Stephen compares the views of 

 Russell and Bergson as to the nature of sense- 

 data. Prof. Stout's paper, "Mr. Russell's Theory 

 of Judgment," is a criticism of the treatment of 

 judgment in Russell's "Problems of Philosophy." 

 Russell there maintains that the fact of error 

 forces us to the conclusion that judgement is not 

 a dual, but a multiple relation, i.e., one which, 

 like "between," involves more than two terms. 

 Othello's judgment that Desdemona loves Cassio 

 is not a relation joining- Othello's mind to the one 

 NO. 2403, VOL. 96] 



objective complex, Desdemona 's love of Cassio, 

 because the falsity of Othello's judgment means 

 that there is no such thing- as this complex : the 

 belief unites Othello's mind and the three objects 

 Desdemona and loving- and Cassio. Stout urges 

 that on this view there is nothing- before the mind 

 to correspond to actual fact. The mind in judg- 

 ment cannot be aware of the judgment complex, 

 because that complex includes the act of judgment. 

 And the objects of judg-ment have, apart from the 

 relation of judgment, no order which can be com- 

 pared with the factual order which is to determine 

 their truth or falsity. 



In his paper, "Conflicting Social Obligations," 

 Mr. G. D. H. Cole attempts to provide a philo- 

 sophical basis for the social and economic doc- 

 trine he has put forward in his recent works, 

 " The World of Labour " and " Labour in War 

 Time," and in a number of articles in the New 

 Age and the Herald. Mr. Cole's object is to 

 restate Rousseau's doctrine of the general will 

 in such a way as to leave room for many other 

 associations, industrial and relig-ious, as well as 

 the State. Mr. Cole's demand is for functional 

 devolution of power for such associations, " a 

 demand that the State itself should be regarded 

 only as an association — elder brother, if you will, 

 but certainly in no sense father of the rest." And 

 if the individual finds himself torn between loyalty 

 to the State and loyalty to the industrial body to 

 which he belongs, we can only say, with Rous- 

 seau, that he ought to consider the good of the 

 community as a whole. 



Messrs. McDougall, Shand, and Stout write on 

 " Instinct and Emotion " ; Prof. Lloyd Morgan on 

 Berkeley's doctrine of esse; Mr. A. Cock on the 

 " .Esthetic " of Croce ; Dr. Tudor Jones on the 

 philosophy of values ; Prof. A. Robinson on the 

 philosophy of Maine de Biran ; Dr. Aveling on 

 "Some Theories of Knowledge" (his treatment is 

 largely based on the recent work of Father Leslie 

 J. Walker) ; and "Miss E. E. Constance Jones and 

 Messrs. Bosanquet and Schiller on "The Import 

 of Propositions." 



(2) Mr. G. A. Johnston has earned the gratitude 

 of students of philosophy for collecting within a 

 small compass the more characteristic passages 

 from the works of Reid, Ferguson, Beattie, and 

 Dugald Stewart. At a time when many are in- 

 clined to distrust the Kantian solution of Hume's 

 sceptical difficulties it is interesting to read an 

 alternative solution of these difficulties in the 

 natural realism of the Scottish Philosophy of 

 Common Sense. In a brief introduction Mr. 

 Johnston gives an account of the relation of Reid 

 and his followers to Locke, Berkeley, and Hume. 



E. H. Strange. 



